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Summary: 
I will in this thesis examine the family gap in pay (i.e. differences in hourly pay 
between mothers and non-mothers) among Norwegian women. 
While women in general make up a substantial part of the workforce today, a 
large literature shows that women with children have lower hourly earnings 
than women without children even with same type of education and experience. 
Evidence of a family gap in pay has been found for the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Germany and also for Norway. 
Conventionally, five explanations have been given to explain  the lower 
wages of mothers. (1) Mothers may earn less because they lose experience that 
are relevant for their work effort, (2) they may be less productive at work due to 
childrearing,(3)they may choose jobs more compatible with childrearing but at 
the expense of higher wages, (4) employers might discriminate against mothers, 
(5)or it could be that non-mothers differ from mothers in ways that are relevant 
for wages and careers. However, which of these explanations to put most 
emphasis on is still an unresolved matter in the literature of the family gap.  
The available data was obtained from Statistics, Norway and the 
Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO). It covers the private business 
sector in Norway for the years 1980-1997.  The data contains information about 
wages, establishments, occupation, age, education, family status, number of 
children (including when they were born) and more. The feature of the data 
(matched employer –employee data) allows me scrutinize the causes of the 
family gap in ways that have not been done before. 
One important aspect concerns that of employer discrimination. With the 
available data I can see if mothers are being paid less than non-mothers once 
they perform the same work for the same employer. Another central aspect 
concerns the time-frame of the data. A presumption in the exciting literature of 
the family gap is that the lower wages for women with children can be explained 
by the lack of well-developed family policies in such countries. The data I have 
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available covers the years 1980-1997, a period with significant expansion in 
family policies in Norway. This allows me to see if the penalties to motherhood 
have changed over time, and to see if the family policies implemented in this 
years have had any of the intended effects.  
I will use Ordinary Least Square Models (OLS) to examine the family gap 
in Norway with the natural log for wage as the dependent variable. In my 
analyses I will use different specifications of the OLS model, which will take into 
account the different levels of the data which arises with matched employer-
employee data. 
The main finding from my analysis is that is has occurred a great change 
in the situation for mothers in the private sector. The critical disparities in wages 
between mothers and non-mothers evident in the earliest years are  severely 
reduced  by the end of study. However, mothers still earn on average less than 
non-mothers, and these differences also increase with how many children you 
have. The main explanation for this is that mothers are  sorted on different 
occupations and different establishment where lower wages prevails compared 
to non-mothers. Another important finding is when mothers and non-mothers 
actually work for the same employer and in same establishment, they receive 
same pay. As such within-job-wage discrimination is not what constitutes the  
family gap in pay in Norway. 
Whether this differential sorting is due to some compensating differentials 
i.e. mothers seek this position because they are more easily combined with 
childrearing but at the expense of lower wages,  or if it is a result of employer 
discrimination is difficult to determine. One could imagine that employers in the 
hiring situation channel mothers in to lower paid occupations, or give mothers 
less promotions compared to non-mothers. But also mothers may choose to 
spend less time at work and /or give less effort at work when they have children. 
in order to settle such a discussion more research on how family life and work 
life intersect is needed.  
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1 Introduction  
How does motherhood affect employed women’s wages?  
Analyses about wage differences between men and women have been of interest 
to researchers for several decades. Traditionally, the lower wages of women or 
what has been known as the gender wage gap has to a great extent been explained 
by gender differences in the level of human capital (Becker 1962, 1985; Mincer 
and Polachek 1974) or by discrimination theories (Hersch 1991:746). 
Many western countries implemented acts concerning equal pay and 
equal opportunity in the 1960s and the 1970s, which led to a decline in the gender 
wage gap (See Petersen 2002 for a thorough discussion). The decline was also 
prompted by a general rise in women’s educational attainment and currently 
women’s education level is close to that of men’s. In addition, employment 
patterns among women have increasingly converged with those of men. Women 
no longer systematically leave the labor force permanently when they reach their 
childbearing years, and in many western countries the average age for women’s 
first born have increased with several years (Rønsen 2004: 271; Taniguchi 1999).   
These effects combined have led to a rise in the human capital level of women. 
In many ways, these changes introduced women to a new opportunity structure, 
not available to earlier generations of mothers. In part this new structure implied 
that family responsibilities and wage labor was no longer incompatible. Despite 
these changes, evidence from several countries shows that the decline in the 
gender wage gap now has stagnated (see e.g. Blau and Kahn 2003). 
This has lead to a search for other explanations as to why the gender wage 
gap still exists.  The role of family responsibilities and how this affects specially 
women’s wages has now been greatly emphasized.  
As early as 1989 did Arlie Hochschild describe in a qualitative study what 
she called the “stalled revolution”. This concept referred to the fact that while 
most women have started to take on the traditionally male roles, they are still 
responsible for most of the home work such as childrearing and housework. As 
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such, the balancing act between paid work and family work is still a mothers 
struggle more than that of two parents (Hochschild 1989). 
Several quantitative studies now show that mothers on average have 
lower hourly wages than women without children (Korenman and Neumark 
1992; Waldfogel 1997; Budig and England 2001; Anderson, Krause and Binder 
2002), and that the differences also increase with number of children. The 
differences in hourly wages between mothers and non-mothers are known as  
the family gap or what is also referred to as the motherhood penalty  
(Wadfogel 1998: 137)1. The family gap constitutes the subject of my thesis.  
Both in Great Britain and the United States the wage gap among women 
with children relative to men is approximately 30%, while among women 
without children the gap relative to men is about 10 % (Waldfogel 1997; Budig 
and England 2001). The differences between the wages for mothers and non-
mothers seem to have escalated in some countries over the last decades, even 
while the gender wage gap has declined (Waldfogel 1998).  
Thus many researchers emphasize this family gap in pay to be an 
important component in explaining the gender wage gap (e.g Nielsen, Simonsen 
and Verner 2004; Waldfogel 1997, 1998).  
 
1.1 The family gap 
Some clarifying remarks on what exact the family gap captures may be of 
interest. The family gap, or what some scholars refers to as the motherhood 
penalty, points to differences in hourly pay between mothers and non-mothers 
after controlling for variables that have severe effects on earnings such as 
education level and labor marked experience. Internationally, empirical research 
on this issue has expanded over the last ten years with emphasis on North 
                                                 
1 Note that the family gap refers to the differential in hourly wages. If mothers have lower working hours this will not directly affect 
the gap. As Waldfogel points out, other family gaps could also exists, e.g. among those caring for parents or those who don’t , but here 
it refers solely to the differences in hourly pay between mothers and non-mothers. 
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America and Great Britain (Waldfogel 1997; Joshi, Paci and Waldfogel 1999; 
Avellar and Smock 2003) as the leading countries, followed by some 
Scandinavian studies (Albrecht, Edin, Sundstrøm & Vroman 1999; Datta Gupta 
and Smith 2002; Hardøy & Schøne 2004) That a motherhood penalty exists is now 
well established, but the magnitude of it seems to differ across nations. Also, the 
effects seem to be somewhat sensitive to the methods applied (Datta Gupta and 
Smith 2002). 
 
1.1.1 Direct effects and indirect effects 
Several studies have measured the direct effect of having children on women’s 
hourly wages. In quantitative analyses like this one, this is done by comparing 
hourly wages of mothers and non-mothers that are similar in ways which are 
relevant for wages and careers, and the only characteristic that separates them is 
whether they have children  or not. 
It is important to bear in mind that looking at differences in hourly wages 
for mothers and non-mothers, is likely to underestimate the long-term effects of 
children on women’s wages. The appearance of children in women’s lives has 
immediate effect on employment for mothers and can lead to sporadic 
participation in the labour market due to childrearing. This has been especially 
remarkable for women’s labor market outcomes because, in relation to men, 
women disproportionately reduce their working hours and/or withdraw from 
the labor market. Reduced labor market experience, decreased on the job effort, 
extensive use of part time or job matches that require lower effort are, or can be 
viewed as consequences of motherhood or what some scholars term the indirect 
effects of motherhood (Avellar and Smock 2003; Anderson, Krause and Binder 
2002, 2003). To gain a comprehensive understanding of women’s or especially 
mothers’ labor market outcomes and to assess the overall cost mothers experience 
of childrearing, it would be useful to examine both the indirect and direct effects. 
Due to both the limited time frame and available data, I will restrict my inquiry 
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to examining the pure or direct effect of motherhood on wages. Furthermore, 
these effects are more observable and available than the indirect effects and may 
therefore be more important for both women’s employment and hiring decisions 
among firms (Anderson et al 2002). 
 
1.2 Why should we be concerned about the family gap?  
There are several reasons to why we should be concerned about a wage penalty 
for mothers. One reason is that of equity. In order to achieve equal opportunity 
and equal pay for women we need to find the reasons for the still growing gap 
between women with and without children (Waldfogel 1998).  
Another reason is that the family gap affects other gender inequalities. 
Women may experience both a time cost and an opportunity cost as a by- 
product of motherhood. The time cost refers to the reduction in labor market 
activity. This reduces accumulation of capital and can lead to lower wages. The 
opportunity cost encompasses both the income foregone because of reduced 
working hours or withdrawal from the labor market. In the long run, such loss of 
income will have negative effects on the wage ratio and pension rights because it 
is based on previous earnings (Kravdal 1992).  
Also the poverty rates between households will be affected by the 
motherhood penalty. The rates will diverge between households headed by 
single women and those headed by single men (Budig and England 2001). More 
generally one can argue that if countries are to utilize fully their labor forces, this 
should include women with children.  
 
1.3 Goals of the thesis  
In this paper I will examine the relationship between hourly wages and children.  
I will constrain my thesis to see how the motherhood penalty is in Norway 
among full time workers in private sector. The inquiry is further restricted to 
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women. Earlier research has shown that there is a penalty on wages for 
motherhood in Norway (Hardøy and Schøne 2003). My work will complement 
their study in two ways.  
First, the data I have available covers a much longer time-period as I have 
annual information from the years 1980-1997.  This time period covers an 
interesting chapter in Norwegian family policies.  Norway’s relevance in an 
international perspective  lies much within that fact that during these years major  
extensions in the family policies have happened. If such policies have had any 
intended effects, namely to reduce some of the cost mothers pay in conjunction 
with childbirth, one should accordingly be able to trace such changes over time. 
Full employment for women and especially mothers came relatively early on in 
Scandinavia in general. In particular maternity leave and publicly funded day-
care for children was presented as a means to maintain women in the workforce 
(Leira 2002: 11). Public childcare was also prompted as educationally 
advantageous for children. The degree and quality of family policies  have 
however changed a lot under the period of study, from rather limited, at least in 
a Scandinavian perspective, to more generous an well-developed. I will point out 
the history of family policies more thoroughly in a later chapter. 
Second, it is also important that the data used in this study allows for very 
precise comparisons of where in the market the family gap is most apparent 
(Petersen 2005). This calls for some thorough explanation. The data has a so-
called matched employer-employee feature.  This feature will allow me to 
scrutinize how children affect women’s wages at different levels of the labor 
market. In my analyses, I will operate with four different levels: the population 
level, establishment level, the occupation level and occupation -establishment 
level. At the population level I will report on what is the average effect of 
children on hourly wages for working mothers when all women from the dataset 
are taken into account and compared, irrespective of the work they perform. 
However, I will account for differences in education level and experience and so 
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fort, to make sure that the only characteristic that separates them is whether they 
have children or not.  
At the establishment level I will take into account the establishment, or 
what is also referred to as the firm-level, where the individuals are working. 
When I am referring to the occupation level, I will compare the effect of children 
among women that also work in similar occupation. Lastly, I can also compare 
the effects of children when the individuals are working in the same occupation 
and also for the same employer. This level will be referred to as the occupation-
establishment level. 
With these comparisons, I hope to see at which level the effects of children 
are most apparent, so it might be clearer where to navigate social policy and 
where it will have its greatest impact. This will be discussed further throughout 
the thesis. 
Additionally, the data contains complete educational and marital 
histories. I can use this information to see if the penalties for having children 
vary between women with different education level and also if the penalties are 
different for e.g. divorced mothers than for married mothers.  
 
1.4 Organization 
The next chapter reviews relevant theories for explaining the gap between 
mothers and non-mothers earnings. In chapter 3 I will go trough the exciting 
literature on the subject. In chapter 4 I will give an overview of what my thesis 
will complement the exciting literature on. Here I will also make an argument for 
the relevance of understanding the family gap in Norway. A brief explanation of 
the historical development of maternal leave schemes will be important here. In 
this chapter some specific and applicable research questions are also derived. In 
chapter 5 I will present the data available to me and give definitions of variables 
used in this thesis. Here I will also explain the methods which will be applied. 
Chapter 6 will describe the results from my regressions. This is followed up with  
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chapter 7 where I discuss the findings more thoroughly. In this chapter I will also 
look at some drawbacks in my analyses and give some suggestions for further 
research. The last chapter summarizes the main findings, and discuss the results 
and their relevance to the theories and previous research done on the family gap. 
A full literature review will be given in the Appendix. 
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2 Theoretical explanations for the family gap in pay 
As a framework for my empirical analyses, I will in this chapter consider some 
theoretical explanations for the link between motherhood and lower wages.  
The study of women’s wages relative to men’s has a long tradition in sociology 
(Mincer and Polacheck 1974; O’Neill and Polacheck 1995). Traditionally, 
differences in pay between men and women have been explained by 
discrimination theories (see e.g. Hersch 1991) or with so called gender-specific 
factors, such as gender differences in qualifications (Blau and Kahn 2003). 
Among the latter, the human capital model has had the strongest influence here. 
Moreover, this theory has also become influential in the study of mothers’ wages.  
            I will start this section with an introduction to human capital theories. 
Thereafter I will consider the theories of occupational segregation, and explain 
how this has relevance for understanding the family gap in pay.  Under  this 
section I will also mention the concept of compensating differences . These 
theories largely build on or influence by human capital theory as well. At last I 
will consider discrimination theories. 
 
2.1 Human capital theory 
A central aspect of human capital theory as developed by Becker (1962, 1985) and 
followed by Mincer and Polacheck (1974), is how it looks at individuals as 
resources with different values in a market. These resources can gain value 
through investment in education or job-experience which is likely to raise their 
productivity and wages. However, there are several causes for how motherhood 
can decrease the potential rewards from human capital.  
 
2.1.1 Motherhood reduces employment experience 
Mothers, and especially women with small children, have high rates of 
employment today in Western countries. Even so, an implication of motherhood 
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is that women with children often have more erratic job histories than non-
mothers. Taking time out of the labor market to bear and raise children reduces 
accumulation of work experience. In turn, this will further affect the productivity 
levels of these women. This is because continuity interacts with the skill-level of 
workers and workers that stay more permanently in the workforce are therefore 
seen to be more productive (Polacheck 2004). 
Additionally, the levels of human capital individuals already have 
attained are also subject to depreciation. Time away from the labor marked, 
reduced working hours and so forth, can lead to lower wages mainly because of 
two reasons. First, individuals do not accumulate new human capital when they 
are absent from the labor marked. Second, the human capital already 
accumulated in forms of education, skills or on-the job training may be subject to 
depletion when workers no longer practise or use their skills.  
Mothers are more exposed to depreciation in human capital as a 
consequence of career interruptions due to motherhood. Since women without 
children are less bound by familial constraints and obligations they should 
according to this theory have steeper (positive) wage trajectories than mothers 
(Datta Gupta and Smith 2002) 
Advocates of human capital theory have emphasized how different 
occupations  also have different kinds of atrophy rate. The atrophy rate is the loss 
of earning potential that can be attributed to periods of work intermittence 
(Polacheck 1981:62). For example jobs with little specialized human capital, or 
little on-the job training are typically easier to re-enter after work interruptions. 
Instead this jobs require general human capital often acquired prior to job-
attainment. One common way to examine this is to treat  education level as 
essentially equivalent to skill-level. As such, this theory predicts lost experience 
to be more crucial for highly educated women compared to lower educated 
women, since they are likely to be in high skilled jobs as well. (Polacheck 2004). 
Since mothers take time away from work in conjunction with childbirth, one 
 11
could expect wage penalties for having children to be higher for women with 
high levels of education.  
However, some researchers have emphasized a competing hypothesis 
(Anderson, Krause and Binder 2002). They argue that time and flexibility at work 
is crucial for working mothers (especially when they have young children). 
However, flexibility at work is generally a privilege that is more prevalent in jobs 
that requires high qualifications. If this argument carries some weight, one 
would expect high-skilled/high educated mothers to be less penalized than their 
low-skilled counterparts. Instead, higher penalties would be found among low-
skilled workers, which are in less position to arrange the balancing act between 
work and childrearing.   
 
2.1.2 Motherhood reduces work effort and job productivity 
According to human capital theory mothers’ lower wages can at large be 
explained by the lower levels of human capital they have attained relative to 
non-mothers because of lost experience. Nonetheless, this theory also depict that 
even among women with equal levels of human capital, women with children 
could still have lower wages due to differentials in productivity or on-the-job 
effort. Becker’s (1985) theory of the “new home economies” argues that time 
spent on leisure activities is crucial for the effort or energy workers will have 
later at work. The rationale behind this is that mothers may be less productive at 
work than non-mothers because the latter can spend more of their non-
employment time in leisure than in housework and childcare. As such, the 
human capital theory predicts that the time and effort women spend on paid 
work are affected by the family work or home duties they perform and this will 
subsequently influences their wages differently. As a result women without 
children have more energy for paid work, while women with children have less. 
Mothers may also “store “energy at work for anticipated work at home. 
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The relevance of this work effort model can be shown in both the academic and 
the popular press discussing the balancing act of working mothers with small 
children (Anderson, Krause and Binder 2002, see e.g. Elligsæther 2004). 
The burden of caring responsibility for mothers could also have 
implications for occupational differences for women with children compared to 
women with children. Mothers may choose to be in less demanding jobs or less 
demanding occupations given the extra work they do at home. I will comment 
this latter mechanism in the following section.  
 
2.2 Theories of occupational segregation 
Rarely emphasized in the literature of the family gap, is the concept of 
occupational segregation. In broad brush strokes, this concept refers to the vastly 
different male-female occupational distributions apparent in many western 
countries (see e.g. Anker 1998).What is of relevance here is that heavily female 
occupations are often less paid than heavily male occupations. As such a portion 
of the gender wage gap in pay can be explained by the differential sorting of men 
and women on different occupations. This theory I will argue, can however be 
relevant for our understanding of the family gap as well. 
There are some debates about what causes these occupational differences 
and it could in fact have many have many potential sources. The role of 
educational segregation which also leads to occupational segregation and the 
role of gender specific socialization is examined thoroughly in England (2005). 
The role family play for occupational segregation is less understood. 
However, there is one specific explanation that could be important for our 
understanding of the family gap in pay, and that is to which extent occupational 
segregation is induced by different family-friendly work conditions. Usually in 
the literature there is common to distinguish between supply and demand side  
mechanisms that generates occupational segregation. I will emphasise the topics 
from the literature that is relevant for explaining why differences between 
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mothers and non-mothers can come about, and pay less attention to theories that 
emphasize sex-differences. 
 
Supply side  
The supply side focus on the employers and what workers bring to the labor 
market of relevant human capital and also how individuals seek the best jobs 
after considering their own personal endowments (Anker 1998). For example will 
women with small children seek occupations were the combination of work and 
childrearing are less difficult and they may also prefer occupation with a work 
environment that are adjusted their needs as mothers. This could be more 
flexible hours to have time for childcare, it could  also be that they choose 
occupations where it is less hard to take career breaks for a period of time in 
conjunction with childbirths.  
Becker (1985) and later Polacheck (2004) have emphasized the supply side, 
that is employees them-self have different preferences which potentially also 
lead to different occupations. Becker argues that it is the division of labor within 
the family which fosters different work patterns and later creates segregation. As 
long as mothers tend to be the one responsible for housework and childrearing, 
Becker stress that women would rationally choose occupations which have high 
starting pay, but low returns to experience, and low penalties to career 
interruptions. 
 
Demand side 
The demand side, have the focus on employers. There are several  ideas about 
why employers might discriminate in hiring or placement within job situations 
which leads to occupational segregation. 
Employers might unconsciously or consciously have distinct preferences 
for whom will best do the work required in jobs or occupations. An example is 
that employers would prefer men in construction works or women in childcare. 
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This discrimination can happen in hiring processes, promotions or by 
channelling women and men in different kinds of jobs. However, one could also 
imagine that these preferences for who are best suited to do a job could make 
employers differentiate between mothers and-non-mothers as well. If different 
occupations demand more unplanned overtime, they might prefer non-mothers 
over mothers, because the latter are considered more flexible in their work 
schedule. 
Women are also considered to be higher cost workers, mostly due to 
characteristics mentioned above, employers might therefore trade off higher 
wages in jobs with primarily women. This is related to the concept of 
compensating differences. 
 
 2.2.1 Compensating differences 
The theory of compensating differences predicts that characteristics within a job 
that is not very attractive for workers are compensated by higher wages. On the 
other hand, jobs that employees find attractive because of more flexible working 
time or even reduced working time, will give lower wages to compensate for 
expenses that employers experience by offering these advantages (Hardøy and 
Schøne 2004:15). Mothers may for example  choose more “mother-friendly” jobs 
as a consequence of motherhood. These jobs are seen as more compatible with 
raising children, but at the expense of lower wages (Budig and England 2001). 
Qualitative studies have shown that the extra burden of domestic responsibility 
also called the “second shift” (Hochschild 1989) may channel mothers in to more 
“mother friendly jobs”.  
However, this could also happen prior to having children. If women 
anticipate future work interruptions because they expect to have children they 
may choose to have jobs which seem more compatible with raising children. 
Hence, such expected work interruptions also influence one’s incentive for 
investment in jobs in terms of education level and fields of study (Polacheck 
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2004). Then again, it could also be that since women or especially mothers are 
considered high cost workers employees pay lower wages without offering any 
compensating advantages. Women are for example said to have higher turnover 
rates, due to childbirths and childrearing. High turnover rates nevertheless raises 
employers costs because they  have to train new workers more frequently (Anker 
1998). 
         Another  demand side explanation focus on the role of statistical 
discrimination. I will comment on this in the next section. 
 
2.3 Discrimination 
2.3.1 Employer discrimination against mothers2 
Another explanation for mothers’ lower wages is employer discrimination. This 
explanation encompasses different ways employers might treat women with 
children differently from non-mothers, in terms of placing mothers in less 
rewarding jobs, promote them less, or pay them less within jobs (Budig and 
England 2001; Petersen 2005). In economic theory, it is common to differentiate 
between discrimination based on prejudice, or formalized as “taste” by Gary 
Becker and statistical discrimination (Altonji and Blank 1999). I will comment on 
the taste model first.  
Here, employers make no assumptions about mothers’ lower 
productivity, they simply discriminate mothers on the basis of their taste and 
preferences. It could be co-workers or customers who have this taste or 
employers themselves (Altonji and Blank1999: 208). One premise for this form of 
discrimination is that employers know their employees family status, i.e. if the 
women have children or not. 
 
                                                 
2 Nonetheless, it could be discrimination external to work organizations, which present formidable barriers to women, 
such as discrimination in the education system, stereotypes etc. Discrimination could also evolve in hiring processes or in 
prior employment relations. Subsequently this could affects the accumulation of experience attained. However, these 
forms of discrimination are outside this framework to try to distinguish. For a thorough explanation of discrimination 
theories, see e.g. Altonji and Blank 1999 
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Another form of discrimination that has been highlighted in the family gap 
literature is statistical discrimination. This concept has its foundation in 
economic theory and is closely related to costs of information. A premise for 
discrimination is that it is expensive to measure individuals’ productivity 
capacities before hiring. Employers therefore use a proxy based on earlier 
experience or pre-assumptions/stereotypes to predict how individuals’ will 
perform. Employers might assume women with children to be less productive at 
work, take more time off from work and so forth, given their status as “mothers”. 
This can in turn lead them to assign women with children to different job, than 
non-mothers. There will then be a pay gap between mothers and non-mothers.  
Nonetheless, this form of discrimination could also pertain to all women 
in general, irrespective of family status. The idea is once again, that it is costly for 
employers to measure individual productivity so employers use average data to 
predict how individuals will perform. Employers, according to this theory, 
expect all young women eventually to have children and to be absent from the 
labor marked for a significant period of time. This may in turn show the way to 
statistically discrimination against all women. Employers can place women in 
different kinds of jobs, pay women less and so forth (Petersen 2005). This form of 
discrimination will however show up as sex-gap in pay, but not as a wage gap 
between mothers and non-mothers.  
 
2.4 Selection effects 
2.4.1 Unobserved heterogeneity 
Most of these explanations see the impact of children on women’s wages through 
some productivity related characteristics. For example how mothers in 
conjunction with childbirths lose experience which affect their productivity 
negatively. Or mothers are anticipated to take out more sick-leave days or reduce 
their working hours, and employers compensate for their lower work effort by 
paying lower wages. But contrary to other forms of explanations, where there is a 
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causal relation between effort and wages unobserved heterogeneity or what is 
also referred to as selection effect, looks at different characteristics within 
individuals, and on how these characteristics could affect wages. 
Possible selection processes might be that women who have children may 
differ from those who do not in ways that are relevant for wages and careers. For 
example it might be that women with lower earning potential may have children 
at relatively higher rates (Budig and England 2001). Then the observed effects of 
children on earnings are not causal but rather exogenous. Even women with 
same qualifications could potentially have different wage profiles, if their 
ambition and motivation for work vary systematically with whether they have 
children or not. Without controls for such selection differences, the effects of 
children on women’s wages could be overestimated. 
The theoretical literature points to several explanations for why there is a 
correlation between motherhood and lower wages. In the next section I will look 
at some basic evidence for the family gap in pay from different countries. 
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3 Previous research and links to the theory 
The theoretical explanations presented in chapter two pointed towards five 
different mechanisms for how motherhood has a negative impact on women’s 
wages. (1) Mothers may earn less because they lose experience that are relevant 
for their work effort, (2) they may be less productive at work due to childrearing, 
(3) they may choose jobs more compatible with childrearing but at the expense of 
higher wages, (4) employers might discriminate against mothers, (5) or it could 
be that non-mothers differ from mothers in ways that are relevant for wages and 
careers. 
In what follows, I will go through the basic evidence of a family gap in 
pay for several countries. I will also see how previous research links their 
findings to theoretical explanations.  
 
3.1 The basic evidence 
A large literature has addressed the impact of family status and children on wage 
outcomes. By controlling for human capital variables in a log wage equation, the 
effects of children on wages are singled out and the residual is interpreted as the 
motherhood penalty.  
In several empirical analyses it has been found that children have a 
negative effect on women’s wages. The negative impact also increases with how 
many children you have. These results hold for several countries among them 
the United States (Budig and England 2001; Waldfogel 1997), the United 
Kingdom and Germany (Harkness and Waldfogel 2003) and also for Norway 
(Hardøy and Schøne 2003). I will first go through some studies done within 
countries and also look into some studies using a more comparative design. 
For the United States in general, a negative effect of children on mothers’ 
wages is found. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the effects seems to be somewhat 
sensitive to the methods applied. Especially how the experience variable is 
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constructed seems to be crucial in some studies. Lundberg and Rose (2000) 
examine the correlation between wages and children among married mothers in 
the period 1980-1992. They report penalties of about 5% lower hourly wages for 
women’s first birth, but they do not control for lost experience. Waldfogel (1997) 
using National Longitudinal Survey of Youth data, report a 6% penalty for one 
child with control for experience. This penalty declines to 4% when she controls 
for whether or not the woman mainly had part-time experience before giving 
birth. Budig and England (2001) use similar data as Waldfogel but includes an 
even more detailed measure of experience. They differentiate  between both full-
time and part-time experience and full-time and part-time seniority (the amount 
of time spent with the same employer). Also they include a measure of how 
many employment breaks the woman has taken, since continuity may influence 
wages. The idea behind this is that among mothers with equal years of 
experience, mothers who have more continuous experience may also have higher 
earnings.  After controlling for this, a child penalty of 5% remains. They conclude 
that the remaining residual penalty to mothers is likely due to some combination 
of productivity differences and employer discrimination (Budig and England 
2001:219). Similarly for all of these studies, is that controlling for selection does 
not have significant impact on explaining part of the motherhood penalty. 
Only two studies from the United States have not found any negative 
effects of children on women’s wages. One study done by Hill (1979) finds no 
penalties, but uses data much older than reported from the above studies. Also, 
she does not control for unobserved differences between mothers and non-
mothers. Korenmark and Neumark (1992) studies the effect of children on 
women’s wages for the years 1990-1992. They do not find any penalties, neither 
with nor without control for experience. But contrary to Hill they do perform 
analyses that control for unobserved differences. However, it could be that the 
two year interval Korenmark and Neumark performed the analyses for was too 
short to pick up any of the negative effects of children on women’s wages. 
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For the United Kingdom the results are less conclusive. Joshi, Paci and Waldfogel 
(1999) examine the family gap among two British cohorts of women. In general 
they find that mothers earn less than childless women, and that this gap in pay is 
similar in both 1978 and 1991. Further they find that human capital differences 
could account for most of the gap in 1978, but this was no longer the case in 1991. 
The most prominent explanation for the wage differences between mothers and 
non-mothers for the latest cohort seems to be the propensity of British mothers to 
work in low paid part-time jobs. Once this is accounted for, they do not find any 
direct penalties for motherhood. 
There is also a good deal of variation across countries in the effects of 
children on women’s hourly wages. Some of whom can best be explained by 
cross-national comparisons. 
Waldfogel and Harkness (2003) investigate the family gap in pay for seven 
industrialized countries (Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, the United States, 
Germany, Finland and Sweden). They find large differences across countries in 
the effects of children on women’s hourly wages. The United Kingdom displays 
the largest penalties, as high as 24% lower wages for a woman with two children. 
The authors partially confirm Joshi, Paci and Waldfogels (1999) findings that 
some of these large differences can be explained by the propensity of mothers in 
the United Kingdom to work in low-paid part-time jobs. Nevertheless, even 
among full-time workers the largest penalties are found in the United Kingdom. 
Further, they find that the effect of children on women’s pay to be smallest in the 
Nordic countries. The findings of Harkness and Waldfogel also points to a link 
between the family gap and the gender gap in pay. Based on computed female-
male wage ratios they find that countries with higher gender gaps tend to have 
higher family gaps as well (Harkness and Waldfogel 2003). A drawback of their 
study is that they do not control for lost work experience. It is therefore hard to 
explain if the country-specific variations in the penalties are due to differences in 
how long mothers stay at home after having children or other more subtle 
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mechanisms. Given the large differences Harkness and Walfogel find between 
countries, they emphasize that further studies should look at the possible effects 
family policies and maternity leave could have on the family gap within 
countries. 
Waldfogel (1998) examine the relationship between lower wages for 
mothers and maternity leave. She compares women in two countries, United 
States and the United Kingdom. For the former country, a twelve week of unpaid 
maternity leave was passed under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) in 
19933. Waldfogel finds that among mothers who are provided a formal maternity 
leave there, is a positive effect of children on women’s wages. She considers 
maternity leave to be one possible remedy for closing the family gap.  
There are several reasons for why maternity leave can have a positive 
impact on mothers’ wages. Leave schemas can induce women’s connection with 
the labor market in general if they are based on previous earnings, as is the case 
in for example  Norway. Moreover, it also gives women the right to go back to 
the same job after giving birth. This can protect women from losing job-tenure 
during their childbirth period ( Waldfogel 1998). Similarly, Polacheck (2004) has 
argued that the negligible effects of children on women’s wages found for 
Sweden and Finland are probably a consequence of the social policy inherent in 
these countries, promoting women’s work. These policies are likely to raise 
women’s level of work experience and job-tenure. Also, he argues that the 
universal access to maternity leave potentially could mitigate the severe penalties 
observed in other countries. 
However the evidence of positive effects of maternity leave on mothers’ 
wages pertains to the United States where maternity leave is a rare amenity. Such 
leave schemas could potentially be used by employers to attract the best workers, 
as long as this is a scarce amenity ( Datta Gupta and Smith 2001) 
                                                 
3 The FMLA act only requires medium and large firms to provide the 12 weeks, not small firms.  
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Another concern is therefore how maternity leave affect mothers’ earnings in 
countries with universal coverage. Some have argued that the positive effects 
discussed by Waldfogel, may be modified in countries with generous maternity 
leave (Datta Gupta and Smith 2002; Petersen 2005). The central argument is the 
following: when leave schemas cover the whole labor market, maternity leave 
will neither negatively nor positively affect wages relative to non-mothers. 
However, the universal character of the maternity leave will affect all women’s 
wages relative to men (Datta Gupta and Smith 2002; Petersen 2005). Here the 
concept of statistical discrimination is of relevance. Since employers in countries 
with universal maternity leave eventually expect young female workers to use 
the maternity leave they might statistically discriminate against all women 
through lower wages or placement into different jobs. 
Evidence of statistical discrimination is hard to point out. Such an 
explanation remains speculative as long as researchers do not have the necessary 
evidence. One study from Scandinavia addresses this concern indirectly. For 
Denmark, Datta Gupta and Smith (2002) do find penalties to motherhood, but 
the effects are miniscule. For one child, they find a 1% penalty, and for two 
children 2% penalty. However, when intra individual analyses are done (i.e. 
controls for unobserved heterogeneity), they find no effects of children on 
women’s wages. They conclude that there is no indication that children have 
long-term effects of women’s wages. In fact, it seems that within a woman’s life, 
as transitions are made to having children, there are rather wage premiums for 
women with children compared to women without children. Yet their study also 
shows that the starting wages for women are considerably lower than those of 
men’s, and that women’s wages seem to continue to be lower than men’s over 
the career (Gupta and Smith 2002:624). They conclude by asking rhetorically if it 
could be the case that the effects of children influences the wage level of all 
Danish women, instead of applying only to those who become mothers.  
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Of other Scandinavian studies I can mention Nielsens’, Simonsens’ and Verners’ 
(2004) also from Denmark. They use the same data as Datta Gupta and Smith, but 
give more emphasis to the different sectors wherein the penalties arise. To 
examine if the penalties to motherhood differ between the private and public 
sector they use a complex model to correct for the sample selection of women 
entering into the two different sectors. They demonstrate that in the “family 
friendly” public sector there is a clear positive effect of being a mother, but for 
the private sector the results are reversed, here they find a strong negative effect 
of children.  
However, as Petersen points out, which of the two different conclusions 
reached by using the same data-set to put most emphasis on is not obvious. It 
depends on the researcher’s level of confidence with results that are made with 
simple models or with complex models (Petersen 2005:7).  
For Sweden, Albrecht, Edin, Sundstrøm and Vroman (1999) examine the 
relation between different career interruptions and subsequent earnings. This 
study is somewhat different from other studies investigation the family gap, in 
which they also include men in their analyses. They find that different types of 
career interruptions have different effects on wages, and that these effects vary 
by gender. They find no penalties for children on wages among Swedish women 
who enter formal maternity leave schemas. Other forms of lost experience have a 
significant impact. The opposite scenario is true for men. Fathers who enter 
parental leave schemas suffer a significant wage loss, almost 10% per year  
( Albreht et al :303). 
The authors reason that these findings cast doubt on the human capital 
model. If the human capital level depreciates with time out of the labor marked 
one would expect all kinds of career interruptions to have negative effects, and 
neither expect the effects to vary so strongly among men and women. Albrecht et 
al propose an alternative explanation that is based on signaling models. This 
theory is closely related to discrimination theories and is based on the premise of 
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cost of information. Since men rarely take out parental leave, the authors argue 
that employers take this as a signal of less career commitment from this men, and 
they respond by penalizing them( 310). On the other hand, since traditionally all 
Swedish women take out parental leave when they have children, the mothers 
behavior cannot signal anything about their career commitment or productivity. 
In Norway, Hardøy and Schøne (2004) do report penalties for children on 
women’s wages ranging from 1, 5% for one child to  3, 5% for two children. They 
control for age, but not lost work experience. However, they do not perform 
intra-individual analyses as e.g. Datta Gupta and Smith (2002) They also find the 
penalties to be slightly higher for women in the private sector compared to 
women in the public sector. 
 
3.2 Summary of the findings 
As we can see from the literature numerous efforts have been made to explain 
the lower wages of mothers. Most of the studies of the family gap in pay are 
conducted within countries. Different samples and methodology have been used 
which affect the basic results as well as the institutional settings where the 
penalties arises. Even so, a somewhat clear pattern emerges from the literature. 
The “liberal welfare regimes” encompassing the United States and the United 
Kingdom (Esping-Anderson 1999) displays the largest penalties, while the 
“social democratic welfare regimes” display almost no penalties. Less is known 
for continental European countries. 
Also the literature documents that maternity leave may have a positive 
impact on reducing the motherhood penalties in countries where such policies 
are scarce. Contradictory, in countries with universal access to maternity leave, 
this may have no effect at all, or negatively affect all women’s wages (Datta 
Gupta and Smith 2002; Petersen 2005). 
In the next chapter I will point to some issues not yet tackled by the 
existing literature and some research questions are then derived. 
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4. Empirical gaps in the literature and my contribution 
The previous chapter looked at the basic evidence for the family gap. Despite the 
growing literature on this issue, and the excessive theoretical accounts for why 
there might be correlation between motherhood and lower wages, the causes of 
the family gap is not fully understood. For that reason, and in order to devise 
better strategies for how to close the family gap, more research on this subject is 
needed. 
I will in this chapter address some topics yet to be analyzed in the 
literature of the family gap. As pointed out in the two previous chapters, a lot of 
theories explaining  why women with children earn less then women without 
children exist. However, direct evidence for which of these theories are plausible 
is lacking. 
On the background of previous research and theoretical considerations, I 
will first address where my contribution to the topic lies. Also, I will give some 
arguments to why Norway is an interesting case in the literature of the family 
gap. An introduction to family policies will be relevant here.  
At the end of the chapter I will ask some specific research questions for later 
examination in my thesis. 
 
4.1 The role of segregation  
The first concern which has relevance for the family gap is based on previous 
findings from the data I have available.  
The data I will use is where Petersen, Snartland, Becken and Olsen (1997) found 
the highest gender wage gap in Norway. Further research on the same data 
showed that sex-segregation at occupation level and establishment level partly 
explained these wage differences between men and women (Nielsen, Høgsnes 
and Petersen 2004). I will build on their study and examine to what extent 
segregation also can explain wage differences between mothers and non-
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mothers. Occupational segregation was mentioned in the theoretical discussion 
as a possible component of the family gap, but to my knowledge there exists no 
study which has explored this issue further. However, segregation of mothers 
and non-mothers on different sectors in the labor market have been emphasized  
( Nilsen, Simonsen and Verner 2004). 
Occupational sex-segregation is widespread in many western countries 
(for a comparative study see e.g. Anker 1998). A lot of this segregation can be 
explained by differences in educational attainment; where men and women 
choose different kinds of fields of study which also leads to different 
occupational choices. These educational preferences can have many sources, such 
as gender specific socialization in the families or education system. However, for 
the subject of this thesis I will be interested in the role family and children have 
for creating occupational segregation between mothers and non-mothers right. 
 There are some studies which point to segregation of mothers and non-
mothers in to different sectors of the labor market. The explanation for such a 
pattern is that  the labor market is divided in mainly two sectors; where one of 
the sectors are more family friendly than the other (see e.g. Nielsen, Simonsen 
and Verner 2003). Further it is found that women who intend to be, or are 
already mothers, deliberately seek to the sector which is most family friendly 
(Hansen 1995). 
However, one could imagine that such family friendliness is not only 
limited to different sectors, but could potentially encompass different firms and 
occupations as well.  
The features of the data, which will be explained thoroughly in the next 
chapter, also allows me to see if the penalties to motherhood are mainly due to 
different sorting of mothers and non-mothers on different establishments, 
occupations and occupation-establishments units. If the penalties for having 
children mainly flow through segregation, we will see a decline in the penalties 
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once controls for establishment, occupation and occupation-establishments are 
being made. 
Given that I have large-scale date, which rarely holds information about 
characteristics of jobs (as to whether they provide childcare at work, involves a 
lot of unplanned overtime or so forth) the results from my analyses must be 
interpreted with caution. However, the results could be suggestive for further 
research and for further discussion about political implications of such findings.  
A second topic I will explore further is the role of discrimination. As 
mentioned in the theoretical discussion, several theoretical accounts exist for 
why employers might discriminate against mothers. The common way to study 
discrimination is to control for human capital variables in a log wage equation, 
and the residual is usually interpreted as due to discrimination or productivity 
differences (see Budig and England 2001) 
However, as Budig and England points out, one weakness in social 
science is that direct measures of either productivity or discrimination are hardly 
available (Budig and England 2001). Therefore, to empirically differentiate 
between these two processes is difficult. However, understanding which 
mechanism is most relevant here, will have implications for our understandings 
of the family gap, and subsequently for policy making around it (Petersen 
2005).Matched employer-employee data can give new insights to this issue. 
Comparing mothers and non-mothers once they do same work for the same 
employer will at least tentatively give answers to if employers give differential 
treatment to mothers and non-mothers. Such a form of discrimination is called 
within-job wage discrimination (Petersen and Morgan and 1995). By taking into 
account the occupation-establishment mothers and non-mothers work in, I can 
examine if this is a prevalent form of discrimination in Norway, and so to say if 
this can explain some of the family gap in pay. 
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4.2 The role of different characteristics among women 
Another concern that remains unsolved pertains to what extent the motherhood 
penalties are different among women with different characteristics. There are 
especially three characteristics that I will look further into.  
 
4.2.1 Education level 
In the theory chapter I mentioned how advocates of human capital theory 
developed two competing hypotheses of how penalties for having children 
might differ between women with different kinds of educational attainment. The 
first hypothesis was that penalties would be higher for women with high 
education levels. This was explained by the fact that the qualifications required 
in high skilled positions are also likely to be more vulnerable to atrophy. As 
such, mothers are more penalized in jobs were employers pay higher costs for 
their employees’ career interruptions. The second hypothesis emphasized time as 
crucial for working mothers and assumed that more flexible working hours 
would also be more compatible with raising children. Contrary, they predicted 
mothers in low-skilled jobs to be more penalized for having children.  
Little evidence of this is known in the family gap literature, and even less 
in the research pertaining to Scandinavian countries4. Most prior research on the 
family gap uses education mainly as a control variable and do not take into 
account that penalties could vary significantly between education groups. 
I will examine if the motherhood penalties vary between mothers with different 
kind of education level. 
Another inquiry which came out of the theories of occupational 
segregation is to what extent wage penalties for having children will be different 
in jobs with mostly women, or in jobs with mostly men. The concept of 
compensating differences emphasized that mothers may trade off wages due to 
                                                 
4 Two studies from the United States have examined this issue, but the results are vague and ambiguous (see Anderson, 
Binder and Krause 2002, 2003). The results are also less relevant to other countries with different education systems. 
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some mother friendly characteristics of these jobs. Polacheck (2004) also argues 
that women, due to anticipated work interruptions in conjunction with childbirth 
choose occupations with low atrophy rates. These jobs are therefore considered 
more easily to re-enter after career breaks. 
On the other hand it could also be that employers pay less in occupations 
primarily held by mothers, since mothers are considered high cost workers. All 
these mechanisms was more thoroughly discussed in chapter 2. 
As such, I would expect sex-composition at job to have different impact on 
the motherhood penalties. I would expect for example lower wage- penalties for 
having children in occupations with more women, since this theory predicts that 
these occupations already pay less than occupations with more men. Contrary, I 
will expect the wage penalties for having children to be higher in heavily male 
dominated workplace, since career interruptions in conjunction with childbirth 
here will be more rare, and are therefore likely to be penalized more. Since 
originally the data set holds information about men as well, I have used this 
information to calculate female/male domination at the workplace. 
 
4.2.2 Marital status 
It could also be that the motherhood penalties vary for women with different 
marital status. There are some evidence that the motherhood penalties are 
especially crude for single mothers, and that these differences could be even 
larger than anticipated at least for the United States and the United Kingdom 
(Waldfogel 1998). For Scandinavian countries less is known of how marital status 
pertains to the family gap. In fact, most prior research on the family gap has 
included differential marital statuses additively (i.e. as a control variable) when 
trying to estimate the pure effect of children on women’s wages. In addition to 
Waldfogel (1998), Budig and England (2001) have also explored this issue 
further. The results from these two studies are quite ambiguous. Budig and 
England find that married and divorced women have higher penalties than never 
 30
married women, contrary to Waldfogel’s findings. Theoretically the causal arrow 
can point both ways. Budig and England (2001) argues that married mothers can 
choose to spend more time at home or choose mother friendly jobs at the expense 
of higher wages, given their spouses economic resources. This will in turn lead to 
higher penalties for married mothers consistent with the findings of Budig and 
England. Alternatively, the theory of marriageability (Waldfogel 1998a) states 
that married women are a select group, and that they typically have higher 
earnings than single women. This explanation is more consistent with 
Waldfogels findings. The effect marital status has on women’s wages thus seems 
to be rather complex. 
 
 4.3 The role of family adaptations and family policies 
Another question that I will examine is whether the penalties for children have 
changed over time. There are some reasons to expect that they have declined. 
First, as stated in the introduction, women no longer tend to leave the workforce 
permanently when they have children. This should narrow the human capital 
differences between mothers and non-mothers, and subsequently discrimination 
against mothers should also weaken. Changes and improvements in the private 
sphere could also facilitate the situation for mothers. Men have increased their 
time used on housework and children for the last decades leading towards a 
more dual breadwinner model (Leira 2002; Avellar and Smock 2003). Employers 
may respond to all these changes by not anticipating mothers to be less 
productive and give mothers the same opportunities as other workers.  
Another reason to assume a decline in the family gap is the expansion of 
family policies in Norway during the last decades. In the previous chapter, we 
saw that some researchers are arguing that the family policies in Scandinavian 
countries might have a mitigating effect on the family gap in pay (Waldfogel 
1998a; Polacheck 2004). The differences in benefits for families that exist among 
countries can partly be explained by the fact that in the Nordic countries 
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childcare and responsibility for generational reproduction is a public domain, 
whereas in the United States and the United Kingdom the provision of childcare 
is taken to the market (Leira 2002, Esping-Andersen 199?). 
Norway is an especially interesting case in that matter. Its relevance lies 
much in the fact that is an “intermediate” case when it comes to family policies 
(Petersen 2005). As I will document further, Norway  has more family policies 
than the United States and The United Kingdom, but less than Sweden and 
Denmark. 
I will also emphasize the time-span the data covers. I have complete 
information from 1980 to 1997 for full-time workers from the private sector. This 
time-frame covers an interesting chapter in the development of family policies in 
Norway which has gone trough some severe changes in the period of study. In 
this forthcoming section I will give a description of the historical change which 
has taken place concerning family policies in Norway.  
 
4.3.1 Institutional setting  
In Norway, the government has been an active agent in forming family policy 
that includes both men and women in the labor market. Norway therefore has a 
range of variation in childcare and public policies aimed at facilitating the 
combination of employment and family obligations. The dual breadwinner 
model has taken over from the traditional male breadwinner model. This has 
resulted in high female labor force participation and also high fertility rates 
compared to other western European countries (Kitterød 2003, chapter 3).  
There are especially two interrelated amenities that are considered to have 
an impact on mothers’ wages, and can help mitigate the family gap: maternity 
leave and access to childcare services. But as we are about to see, there has been a 
considerable variation in the policies over the years of study. Along with a 
description of the public benefits for mothers’ (or parents) in Norway, I will 
make some comparisons to other countries where possible. This might be of 
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relevance for the comprehension of previous research and to better grasp the 
implication family policies have for the family gap in pay. 
 
Parental leave 
In Norway, paid leave schemas was established through the Social Insurance Act 
and dates back to 1956. Though both parents have been entitled to share the 
leave since 1977, the common practice is that women take time off from work 
(Kitterød and Kjelstad 2002).  
To have a right to parental leave with job protection, women must have 
been in the same occupation at least six months before childbirth. This makes a 
strong incentive for Norwegian women  to be employed full time even before 
giving birth or to delay having children until the wages are high enough (Rønsen 
and Sundstrøm 1998). Initially, mothers were entitled to 12 weeks of income 
compensation in conjunction with childbirths, but the compensation rate was 
pretty low.  In 1978 the rate was raised to cover 100% of former income (Rønsen 
2004: 278). Further extensions in the benefit period did not apply before 1987 
when the leave was extended to twenty weeks. 
  The major extension happened in the 1990s. From 1993 the parental leave 
schemas have been available for 52 weeks with 80% pay or 42 weeks with 100% 
pay. 6 weeks are reserved for the mother, and four weeks are reserved 
exclusively for the father. Sweden has even longer paid maternity leave; 15 
months with a 90% coverage of gross earnings (Albrecht et al. 1999: 299). In 
Denmark mothers have been eligible for 28 weeks of maternity leave at a 90% 
coverage rate in the private sector and with 100% coverage rate in the public 
sector. The period was further extended to 52 weeks in 1994 (Nielsen, Simonsen 
and Vroman 2003). The leave period in Norway has to be used in one go, or you 
would loose the benefit days. In comparison Swedish mothers can decide how to 
use their leave period in a more flexible way. They can use the leave full time or 
part time until the child is eight years old (Rønsen and Sundstrøm 1998).  
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Maternity leave is assumed to be important for mothers’ wages in two important 
ways. First, it secures job-protection so that mothers don’t have to apply for new 
jobs after childbirth. Usually, evidence points to that changing jobs after being 
away from the labor market in conjunction with childbirth reduces wages 
(Felmlee 1995).  
Second, research have shown that the right to paid maternity leave with 
job-security speeds up the return to work for mothers in both Norway and 
Sweden (Rønsen and Sundstrøm 1998: 267). This should counterfact the 
depletion of human capital, since most mothers will return to the same job, 
within the time frame of the available leave schemas, and the schemas also 
protect against loss of seniority. However, the return to work is especially 
dependent on access to childcare services. 
 
Childcare services 
The access to childcare services has also changed a lot the last decades. This is an 
important component of the family policies, since access to such services will 
determine the return of mothers to work. Childcare is heavily subsidized in 
Norway. This is important because in other countries the choice of being home or 
returning to the workforce in conjunction with having children, is often based on 
the economic cost of childcare services. Childcare-services usually encompass 
kindergarten and day-care home in Norway. Private use of nanny’s or au pairs is 
not really widespread (Rønsen and Sunstrøm 1998). As a consequence in order to 
go back to work after being on leave schemas, mothers rely heavily on vacancies 
in kindergartens for their children. There is usually an excessive demand for 
spaces in publicly funded kindergartens. 
Even as late as 1987, only 5-8 % of children under three years old had 
access to publicly funded childcare in Norway (Leira 2002). This probably forced 
mothers to stay home longer than the parental leave schemas covered. However, 
during the beginning of the nineties expansions of publicly funded childcare 
 34
took place. In 1995 22% of children from 0-3 years old have access to publicly 
supported childcare. For the same year 61% of 3-6 years old also attended some 
form of public childcare (Leira 2002).  
In addition, families with children under 18 years old are annually 
provided with a significant amount of financial support. Norway also has 
provisions in the tax system, giving tax relief to families with children. Single 
parents also pay lower fees in kindergartens. Both Sweden and Denmark have 
had much higher coverage rates for public kindergartens than Norway. This is 
probably also why Danish mothers make up a much bigger part of the workforce 
in Denmark than do Norwegian mothers in Norway (Ellingsæther 2004) 
As mentioned earlier, the data available covers a time-span from 1980-
1997. Hence, it covers a period with both limited and more generous leave 
schemas. The mothers included in this study have consequently faced very 
different parental leave schemas. Therefore, if the family policies have had any of 
the intended effects, this could enhance a reduction in penalties for mothers. To 
document such effects, and to determine the role of family policies for women’s 
wages, are essential for our understanding of the family gap. In fact, Harkness 
and Waldfogel (2003) calls for more research on the impact of family policies on 
pay for mothers. They also call for more research on this issue especially for 
Scandinavian countries.  
Considering the theoretical literature, previous research and the last 
considerations taken into account, I propose some research questions for further 
inquiry in this thesis. The first questions to be analyzed are: 
 
1) What is the family gap in pay at the population level, the establishment level, 
the occupation level and the occupation-establishment level? Here it will be 
interesting to compare the coefficients as one goes from one level to another i.e. 
from the establishment level to the occupation level. It will also be of interest to 
see if there are any differences in hourly wages between mothers an-non-mothers 
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once they work in the same occupation and in the same establishment. This will 
be an indicator of employers pay differential pay for equal work. 
 
The second question to be analyzed are: 
2) Which mothers bear the penalties?  
Here I will mainly examine if there are any differences in penalties for having 
children among women with different education level. I will also look into if the 
penalties varies for mothers who work in heavily male dominated jobs compared 
to mothers who work in more sex-integrated or female dominated jobs. 
I will also look into if the penalties  for having children are different among 
women who have different marital status. 
 
The third question to be analyzed are  
3) What have happened to the family gap in pay over time?  
Given the extension in family policies I will investigate the  role  family policies 
such as maternity leave and child care play in  closing the gap between mothers 
and non-mothers. 
 
 I will now present the data I have available and explain the methods for my 
investigation. 
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5 Research design 
In this section I will describe the data that are available to me and, and also 
explain my methods. Different from earlier studies of the family gap presented in 
the previous chapter, there are especially two advantages with the data I have 
available. As mentioned in the introduction, this is a longitudinal data set with a 
time-span over 18 year. If there are considerable changes over time that will 
affect the family gap, this will be captured by my analyses. Moreover, the 
matched employer-employee feature of the data allows me to see at which level 
in the labor market the differences in pay between mothers and non-mothers are 
most prominent.  
I will first give a description of the data, and then give some definitions of 
variables. The last section of the chapter will explain the methods. 
 
5.1 Data 
The available data was obtained from Statistics Norway and the Confederation of 
Norwegian Enterprise (NHO). It covers white-collar workers in the private 
business sector in Norway. It is an important sector of Norwegian economy, in a 
way that it is central for wage setting for other sectors as well. Among the 
employees  are white-collar workers in the manufacturing industries, oil and 
mining industries, building and construction work, transport and various other 
industries. Most of these other industries are small, compared to the 
manufacturing industries. 
As an example I can mention that for 1992 we have complete data on 84% 
of the establishments and 94% of their white-collar employees. Thus the data are 
fairly complete.  
It’s also the industry for which Petersen et al (1997) found the highest 
gender wage gap for all different levels: the population, establishment, 
occupation and occupation-establishment level. This ensures enough variation in 
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the dependent variable, hourly wage,  also at the occupation-establishment level, 
which I will describe later. 
The data from the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise is for white-
collar employees and the information about both individuals and firms is 
available on an annual basis from 1980 to 1997. Originally, the data holds 
information for men as well, but for the purpose of this thesis, they are excluded. 
However, I have calculated the female proportion based on information about 
them as well for some later analyses. This will be explained under the relevant 
section when I describe the data.   
The data contains information about wages, working hours, occupation, 
age, and more. The data have been matched to register data from Statistics 
Norway using the system of personal ID numbers in Norway. This gives us exact 
information about the employees. Of special interest for this thesis is that the 
register data offers information on number of children, the children’s age, and 
marital status. We also have information about all the individuals’ educational 
attainment. Included here, is information of not just the years attained, but also 
the fields of study. Overall this information gives us continuous educational, 
marital, and parental histories.  
Table 5.1 give a description of the data, for which later analyses are done. 
Column 1-2 shows the number of women employed. For the year 1987 we only 
have information about individuals present in both 1988 and 1987, thus the 
number of observations for this year is lower than for the other years. In 1997 
NHO changed the ways the data were compiled so the number of employees is 
lower for this year. Column 2 shows percent women in the data. Column 3 
shows number of establishments. Column 4 shows the original number of 
occupations, while column 5 shows the aggregated grouping of the originally 210 
occupations into 21 occupation groups. I will describe this in more I detail below. 
 Column 6 shows the number of occupation–establishments, and finally column 7 
shows the average wage for all women.  
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Table 5.1. 
Number of observations included in the analysis by year. Share of women and women as percent. Also number of 
establishment, occupation, occupation groups and occupation- establishment for which the women work in. Last 
column shows the average of hourly wages for women. 
Years Women    % Establishment Occupations Occupation    Occupation Women  
  women      group   establishment   wage 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
1980 13297 22.4 2888 201 21 31749 37.72 
1981 13844 22.4 2914 201 21 32526 42.87 
1982 15302 23.3 2869 204 21 32811 48.81 
1983 15940 23.5 2862 205 21 33120 52.94 
1984 16861 24.1 2762 203 21 32133 58.46 
1985 17973 25.3 2727 205 21 32007 63.62 
1986 19712 26.2 2743 203 21 32233 71.32 
1987 15525 25.5 2361 207 21 26318 79.51 
1988 20896 27.9 2812 211 21 32971 81.78 
1989 21253 27.9 2797 210 21 32595 87.17 
1990 21899 28.0 2674 210 21 31699 94.40 
1991 28133 33.1 2741 211 21 34424 98.93 
1992 28340 33.0 2844 210 21 34652 102.63 
1993 28123 33.0 2795 209 21 33673 106.69 
1994 28524 33.4 2903 209 21 34296 110.86 
1995 28468 33.3 3022 209 21 34708 114.87 
1996 28740 33.5 3121 208 21 35380 121.09 
1997 25061 33.5 3140 208 21 32673 129.08 
Sum 387872  50972 3724 378 589960   
Note: Information about the individuals is collected on an annual basis, except for 1987. Here we only 
have information about individuals that was in the data in 1988 and 1987 so the number s are lower for 1987. The 
procedures for collecting data were changed in 1996 so the number of observations is lower in 1997. 
 
 
       
There are a few things worth mentioning from the table. First, the numbers of 
white-collar women has increased from 13 297 workers in 1980 to 25 061 in 1997.  
The computed percent female shows that this is largely a sector made up of men, 
as women make up roughly 20-30% of the workforce. However, the women’s 
share has increased with roughly 10 % from 22.4 in 1980 to 33.5 in 1997. The 
largest increase happened from 1990-1991, and this reflects the fact that part-time 
workers were now included in the collecting process. I have nonetheless 
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excluded part-time workers from my analyses, so my findings will only pertain 
to full-time workers.  
This means that I will ignore the potential effects part-time employment 
can have on the family gap in pay. This is cumbersome since part-time 
employment has shown to be an important component of the family gap in pay 
in other countries (see e.g. Joshi, Paci and Waldfogel 1999). 
However, for Norway this may be different. There is a considerable 
market for part-time in Norway, and the last years the amount of women 
working part-time has also increased. However, of importance for this analysis is 
the fact that payment for part-time and full-time is not very different in Norway. 
In fact Norwegian working life legislations cannot discriminate between full-time 
and part-time work (Torp and Barth 2001). The one previous study of the family 
gap done in Norway, do not find substantial differences in the motherhood 
penalties for part-time workers compared to full-time workers (Hardøy and 
Schøne 2004).As such, I could not expect to find large differences in wages 
among full-time and part-time workers either. Nonetheless, it could of course be 
that part-time mothers are highly overrepresented in the lowest paid occupations 
and establishments in Norway.  
The number of occupations varies from 210 in 1980 to 211 in 1987 and 208 
in 1997. Each year there are 21 occupation groups. The table also show that there 
are several thousand establishments and also occupation-establishments, every 
year. This adds complexity to the analyses which I will describe in the section 
under methods, but it also allows for examining the family gap in new and 
different ways. The last column shows that the average wage has increased from 
37.7  in 1980 to 129.1 in 1997.  
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5.2 Definitions of variables 
As the aim of this thesis is how hourly wages relate to motherhood status, my 
variables are selected with the intention to clarify one aspects of how women’s 
wages are affected by the presence of children. By systematically using control 
variables to make the individuals comparable, I hope to isolate the effect mainly 
children have on hourly earnings.   
 
5.1.1 Dependent variable 
Wage 
My dependent variable is the logarithm of an individual’s hourly wages. It is 
computed using information about contractual monthly pay and contractual 
hours worked per week. Overtime is not included in this and I will therefore not 
be mixing wages earned on a regular contractual basis with those of overtime. 
Overtime is usually paid at much higher rates than contractual work. If non-
mothers work more overtime than mothers, but no distinction was made 
between the regular and overtime components, the average gap between 
mothers ad non-mothers could be seriously overestimated (Nielsen et al 2004). 
The contractual monthly pay is simply divided with the contractual hours 
worked per month. I then take the logarithm to arrive at the hourly wage. An 
advantage of the logarithmic specification is that it’s simple to use as long as you 
only have positive values (Stolzenberg 1980: 465). Also the main reason for using 
the logarithm rather than the hourly wage itself is that is coefficients can be 
interpreted as relative differences. Furthermore, all the articles surveyed in 
chapter 3 use the logarithm for hourly wage as the dependent variable. My 
findings are then easier to compare with previous research. I will give a brief 
illustration of how to interpret logarithms: with for example a coefficient for 
having 1 child showing -.10 , this will be interpreted  as the average hourly wage 
for mothers with 1 child is 10% lower compared to non-mothers. It the coefficient 
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is bigger than .15 /. 20 it must be exponensiated to show the relative difference. 
The formula to use is (exp (coeff)-1).   
 
5.1.2 Independent variables 
Children 
The principal independent variable is children under age 20, and by adding 
different control variables I can isolate the effect children have on women’s 
hourly wages. The structure of the panel data set up let me identify each person 
through identification numbers as I have described earlier. I therefore have exact 
information about each person’s children, how many they have and when they 
were born. My independent variable is constructed with four values. The 
reference category is ‘childless and the others have the values 1, 2 and 3 or more 
children under age 20. The reason for why I choose number of children under 
age 20 is because the effect of children on wages is considered to have a 
cumulative effect5.  
Table 5.2 shows the number of women and percent women with no 
children, 1 child, 2 children and 3 or more children under age 20 for selected 
years. 
 
 
Table 5.2: Distribution of women with no children, one child, two children and three or  
more children for selected years. 
      No children     one child      Two children Three or more  
Years N   % N % N    %     N   % 
1980 7134 58.95 2545  21.03 1793 14.82 629 5.20 
1985 8923 56.34 3553        22.34 2722 17.19 640 4.04 
1990 9124 49.92 4967  27.02 3575 19.56 611 3.34 
1997 8180 36.86 5618        25.32 6638  29.91 1755  7.91 
 
 
 
The table show that  almost 60% of women do not have children in 1980, 
however the numbers decline steadily. Within 1990 there are about 50% of 
                                                 
5 I also tried the same variable using a dummy for children under age 7 , but this does not change the results significantly. 
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women who don’t have children. The largest decline is during the 1990. For the 
last years of observation, 1997, 36% do not have children. The severe decline in 
the 1990s is probably due to the inclusion of part-time workers in 1991. It seems 
reasonable that a lot of part-time workers have children. There is also a 
substantial increase in women with 2 children from 1990-1997, a rise with almost 
10%. The share of women with 3 or more  children is the smallest group, and 
pertains to only 5-3% of women during the 1980s. From 1990 to 1997 the share of 
women with 3 or more children have increased to almost 8%, also this raise is 
probably a reflection of the inclusion of part-time workers. 
In 1990 and 1997 women without children are still the largest group but women 
with two children make up a substantial share as well. The share of women with 
one child varies between 20-25%. 
  This table also shows that there is enough variation in this central 
independent variable to estimate the impact of number of children on women’s  
wages. 
 
Marital status 
I also have complete (i.e. time- varying) information on the individual’s marital 
status. In all my analyses I will use marital status as a control variable, when 
estimating the effects of children under age 20 on women’s wages. 
However, I will also estimate effects  for having children for women separately 
by marital status. Then we can see if there are substantial differences in the child 
penalty between for example married mothers and divorced mothers. 
I have access to a rather detailed set of marital status categories. They include 
single, married, divorced , separated and widowed. However, one problem with 
this variable is that at the time the data was compiled Statistics Norway could 
not differentiate between those singles and those co-habiting. I have therefore 
chosen to name the group single for never married. Also, I have recoded the 
three last groups to one. The dummies for marital status I operate with will 
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therefore be: Never married (the reference category), married, and the last 
category encompass  divorced, separated and widowed. Table 5.3 shows the 
distribution of women on marital status for selected years. 
 
Table 5.3: Distribution of women on differential marital status for selected  
years. 
 
   Years         Never married              Married                   Divorced* 
 
 
 
*includes those separated, divorced and widowed 
 
 
The percent never married is roughly about 40% in the 1980s but actually 
declines down to 30% at the end of the 1990s. Given that I  lack information of co-
habitation, I would have expected the proportion never married  to have 
increased over the years as a result of the different domestic arrangement that 
has taken place during the time-period. 
The percent married went down with 2% from 1980 to 1985, but has 
increased from about 50% in the 1990 to 56% in 1997. As was for the child 
variable shown in table 5.2, this is probably a reflection of the inclusion of part-
time workers. This could indicate that being married and having two children is 
difficult in the private sector of the Norwegian economy. 
The percent divorced/separated/widowed is stable around 12-23 % during the 
whole period.  
 
5.1.3 Control variables 
I use several variables as control variables, but I will never report estimates from 
the control variables in tables or in the text. I am solely concerned about the effect 
  N % N % N % 
1980 4696 38.81 5972 49.35 1524  22.84 
1985 6335 40.02 7438 46.99 2056 12.99 
1990 6630 36.332 9023 49.44 2599 14.24 
1997 6555 29.64 12520 56.62 3041 13.74 
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children have on women’s wages. A thorough discussion of them is at place 
anyway. 
 
Education  
The education variable is based on a detailed 6 digit code for education from the 
Norwegian standard for educational grouping, Statistics Norway (NUS 2000). 
This information gives both length and type of the education. I have used both a 
broad and a finer differentiation of the education groups.  
The broad classification differentiates between five large groupings based 
on both length and type of education: 1) Middles school  2) High school 3) 
College degree 4) Masters and higher and 5) Professional education. Middle 
school is the reference category. 
Also I have used a second measure for education, which is a finer 
differentiation of the five groupings; middles school is set apart between middle 
school/junior high and high- school dropouts. High school, is set apart between 
those who finished high-school and those who completed high-school and also 
have some college. College degrees and masters’ degrees from both technical 
colleges and  university level is separated in humanities, social sciences, 
economics/administration, natural sciences or other subjects. Additionally; the 
professions are diverted into Civil Engineer, Civil Economist, Social Economist, 
Lawyers, Accountant and Engineer.  
This distribution was generated  to show important educational 
distinctions among  white- collar workers. For example using a measure which 
only takes years of education into account, one would not necessarily see the 
distinction between those with masters and higher and professional education. 
While these categorization of education group is not most common to use, 
Petersen et al have confirmed in earlier analyses that the payoff to education 
varies substantially on which field the degree is obtained in (Petersen 2005). 
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On the other hand, there have been some strict qualifications to not just 
education level, but education type for some of the highest occupations among 
white-collar workers. Especially there has been a demand for civil engineers 
(Olsen 2004). 
However, as with the experience variable, which measure I use, leave the 
results largely unaffected, and I end up by using the 5 groupings for all the 
analyses. The distribution of employees on the 21 different education levels is 
given in table 5.4, while numbers in bold displays the 5 groupings. 
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Table 5.4: Distribution on 20 education type and 5 educational group( bold type) for selected years in numbers and 
percent. Women only. 
         1980       1985      1990     1997  
  N % N % N % N % 
  Middle school   71.6    56.5    47.1     37.83 
1 middle-school/junior high 1820 14,3 1895 10.96 1748 8.73 1504 6.16 
2 high-school drop out 7276 57,28 7733 45,58 7671 38.33 7732 31.67 
  High school  23.0  31.14  34.2  31.9 
3 finished high-school 1946 15,32 3894 22,95 5134 26.65 6109 25.02 
4 high-school plus some college 988 7,78 1390 8.19 1516 7.57 1692 6.93 
  College degree  3.2  7.4  10.5  15.2 
5 Humanities/human sciences 181 1,42 486 2.86 572 2.86 874 3.58 
6 Social sciences 11 0,09 89 0,52 143 0.71 225 0.92 
7 Economics/ Administration 86 0,68 305 1.80 801 4.00 1810 7.41 
8 Natural sciences 25 0,20 85 0.50 182 0.91 265 1.09 
9 other subjects 104 0,82 285 1.68 409 2.04 568 2.33 
  Masters and higher  0.4  1.00  2.4  4.1 
10 Humanities/Human sciences 6 0.05 11 0.06 24 0.12 36 0.15 
11 Social sciences 1 0.01 3 0.02 45 0.22 92 0.38 
12 Economics, Administration 1 0.01 5 0.03 14 0.07 56 0.23 
13 Natural sciences 15 0.12 89 0.52 274 1.37 627 2.57 
14 Other subjects 23 0.18 63 0.37 121 0.60 173 0.71 
  Professional education  1.7  4.2  6.7  10.8 
15 Civil engineer 46 0.36 164 2.45 473 2.36 1120 4.59 
16 Civil economist 27 0.21 103 0.97 165 0.82 337 1.38 
17 Social economist 1 0.01 3 0.61 4 0.02 14 0.06 
18 Lawyer 1 0.01 10 0.02 19 0.09 33 0.14 
19 Accountant 6 0.05 15 0.06 27 0.13 78 0.32 
20 Engineer 139 1.09 375 0.09 672 3.36 1072 4.39 
sum    12703 100.00 16,976 100.00 20,014 100.00 24,417 100.00 
 
The table shows that the majority of women have middle school and high school 
education for all the years 1980,1985,1990 and 1997. While the share of women 
with completed middle school have declined from 71.5% in 1980 to 37.8% in 
1997, there has been an increase of women with completed high school from 23% 
in 1980 to almost 32% in 1997. 
Women with college degree has risen with roughly 12% during the period of 
study from 3% to 15%. 
Only 1,7% women had completed some form of professional education in 1980 
and the numbers have risen to 10,8% in 1997. The more detailed differentiation of 
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education groups also shows that the increase mainly have happened among 
civil engineer and engineers. 
 
Potential Work Experience  
I will use a constructed variable for labor force experience as a control variable. 
Since we have information about the individual’s age and complete educational 
histories I can construct a variable that will indicate years of work experience. 
Several measures for this were experimented with. One was simply to use age. 
The other one was to impute “potential experience”. This was done by taking the 
respondents age, subtract 16, and then subtract years of education beyond that 
obtained by age 16. However, none of this took into account the career brake in 
conjunction with the mother’s childbirth. To account for this, the imputed 
“potential experience” variable was used, but in addition I subtracted one year 
per childbirth a woman have had. This is the measure that will be used in the 
subsequent analyses. However, it is not completely precise since the length of the 
maternity leave has changed a lot over the period and was much shorter the first 
years of study. Even so, childcare services in Norway did not exactly match the 
increase of women with small children in the labour force for a long time. This 
probably forced mothers to stay home to take care of their children even if they 
were not financially compensated by the state. As late as 1987 only 5-8% of 
children under three years old  had access to publicly funded childcare (Leira 
2002). For the 1990s the maternity leave coverage has been nearly a year and 
public childcare have better coverage rates. As such, the measure I use 
approximates the influence children have on mother’s labor force experience. 
Also, potential experience is used in several articles surveyed in chapter 3. My 
results are then easier to compare with previous findings, than if I simply have 
used age. 
Nonetheless, as was for the education variable, using either of the various 
specifications of experience leave the results largely unaffected. 
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Experience squared 
It is likely to assume that the payoff of work experience will reach a maximum at 
a certain level. I include an experience-squared term to see if the relation between 
experience and hourly wages is linear. A significant square term would indicate 
that the relationship is curvilinear.                       
Both education and experience are associated with large wage gains, and 
will be included as control variables in almost all my analyses. 
In addition, I will use the education variable to investigate possible discrepancies 
in penalties among the different education groups. Then the analyses will be 
conducted separately for each education group. 
In table 5.5. I present some selected average values for the experience 
variable, education variable ( in years) and average wages by number of children 
for the years 1980 and 1997. 
 
Table 5.5: Average values for selected variables by number of children, 1980 and 1997 
No One Two Three or more 
children child children children 
      
1980 Average wage 36,9 38,4 38,5 37,5 
 Average experience 13,3 15,1 18,7 20,8 
 Length of education 3,4 3,3 3,3 3,1 
1997 Average wage 130,6  131,2   137,5 143,5 
 Average experience 16,9 17,9 17,0 16,8 
 Length of education 4,4 4,28 4,4 4,7 
 
Note: only for individuals between 20-50 years old 
 
If one look at the experience variables, the table show that it is probably on 
average a younger group of women that are apparent in 1997 than in 1980, since 
the average experience actually have declined, at least for women with 2 and 3 or 
more children, over the years. 
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The table also show that the average education level has risen for both women 
with and without children. 
 
Accounting for different levels 
Also to fully maximize the characteristic of the data set available to me, I will 
look at the effects of children on hourly wages at different levels. This is an 
important quality with the data. Not do I only single out the effects of marital 
statuses and children at the population or the market level, but I can also control 
for establishment, occupation and occupation- establishment unit (Petersen 2005)  
By comparing the estimates I can see how the effects of children on (log) hourly 
wages transform at different levels. 
 
The population level 
At the population level I control for marital status, education, potential 
experience and its quadratic term, to see the effect of children on hourly wages. 
Here, I report what on average is the effect of children, all else equal. By “all else 
equal” I refer to a concept in statistical analyses, in which one try to isolate an 
effect of  independent variable on a dependent variable, after controlling for 
other variables that usually are prior to the effects of the independent variable 
(England 2005). 
However, at this level all individuals are taken into account, irrespective 
of what kind of work the do, or what kind of occupation they work in.  
The estimates from this analysis will resemblance the estimates of the family gap 
from the articles reviewed in chapter 3. 
 
The establishment level 
I then control for the establishment level, estimating the effect of children on 
wages controlling for the establishment in which the employee works. I use 
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dummy variables for each establishment in the data. There are several thousands 
establishments in the data (see table 5.1 column 3). 
We can then see if the effect of children also plays a role at the establishment 
level, when mothers and non-mothers work in the same establishments. 
I also control for marital status, education, and potential experience and its 
quadratic term in this analysis. This needs some further explanation.  
Occupational segregation have been emphasized in earlier studies as an 
important component of explaining the gender wage gap in pay. That is, women 
are sorted on occupations where lower wages prevails than men and thus this 
can explain the wage differences between men and women (see e.g. England 
1982). Implicit in this analyses is that employers discriminate women to 
occupations that are lower paid. However, e.g. Polacheck (2004) have argued that 
some of these studies do the mistake and overestimate the importance of 
occupational segregation per se for explaining the gender wage gap. The criticism 
is that they do not include control variable for e.g. age and education. As such 
they do not account for “how much human capital one might have acquired” 
(Polacheck 2004: 20). Polacheck argues that it is the accumulation of human 
capital between men and women which leads to segregation, and not for 
example employer discrimination (Polacheck 2004). To meet such a claim I have 
included the control variable in these analyses as well. 
 
The occupation group level 
The occupation-group level variable needs some thorough addressing, as this 
variable is important for several of my analyses. First, I will use it to control for 
the occupation-group the employee works in, but second this variable are also 
important for answering the question if sex composition at the workplace can 
explain some of the motherhood penalties. 
First I will explain how this variable was constructed. In the forthcoming 
analyses when I refer to the occupation-group level , I control for 21 occupation –
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groups the employees works in. This is an aggregation of the 210 occupations 
which I presented in table 5.1.  
However, in order to assemble the 210 occupations into 21 groups in a 
meaningful manner, some of the 210 occupations was excluded. The 21 
occupational groups are therefore made up of about 155 occupations instead of  
210. The reasons for this was that the 155 occupations are by the employing firms 
organized into a hierarchy, while the 55 occupations excluded did not fit into 
such a hierarchy. 
The 21 occupation groups are further organized into five career ladders with 
workers in technical, supervisory, office, retail and warehouse position. Each of 
these ladders include from about 2 to 9 occupations. The different ranks within 
each career ladders are hierarchical so that each occupation group have more 
autonomy and higher salary. For example the office position ladder consist of 5 
ranks of occupational groups where assistant director (13) is the highest level in 
this ladder, and routine work (17) is the lowest level. However I can not compare 
occupations across ladders. For example the highest positions one can occupy 
among the white- collar workers are company directors (1) and chief engineers 
(2), but also assistant director (13) and sub director (14). 
The distribution of women on different occupations and career ladders are 
shown in table 5.6 for selected years. However, in addition to use occupation-
group level as a control variable I will also use information based on the career 
ladders to examine if sex composition at the workplace can explain some of the 
motherhood penalties. To examine this I needed to calculate the share of female 
based on all workers in the data, including men. These numbers are showed in 
parenthesis within each career ladder. I will explain how to do this more 
thoroughly in the methods chapter, but basically this analyses will we based on 
the different career ladders.                                                                                          
Summing up, table 5.1 shows an aggregation  of  155 occupations into 21 
occupation-groups. These occupation –groups are further aggregated into five 
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career ladders each ladder consist of 2-9 occupations. Each career ladder displays 
percent women of all women and also percent women of total number (both men 
and women) in each ladder in parenthesis. 
 
Table 5.6: Distribution of women and percent women of total women in each career ladders (bold type) and next in 
each  occupation group, percent female of total ( men and women) in parenthesis for selected years. 
                 1980                1985              1990                    1997 
  Occupation level  N %  N %  N %  N % 
  Technical positions  
  7.1 
(5.96)           
 11.0 
(9.33)  
 
  14.9 
(13.92)   
  20,7 
(16.28) 
1 Company director   1 0.01 3 0.02 15 0.07 
2 Chief engineers 2 0.02 13 0.08 51 0.28 184 0.83 
3 Managing positions 16 0.13 87 0.55 217 1.19 494 2.23 
4 Responsibility with leadership 21 0.17 79 0.50 206 1.13 377 1.70 
5 
Responsibility without 
leadership 26 0.21 170 1.07 430 2.35 876 3.95 
6 Autonomous with leadership 18 0.15 83 0.52 126 0.69 221 1.00 
7 
Autonomous without 
leadership 104 0.86 351 2.22 584 3.20 1137 5.12 
8 Qualified routine/work 215 1.78 479 3.02 556 3.04 821 3.70 
9 Routine work 457 3.78 486 3.07 551 3.01 478 2.15 
  Supervisory positions 
  1.7 
(2.23)  
  1.2 
(3.69)  
  1.7 
(5.69)  
 1.5 
(5.73) 
10 Positions of leadership 2 0.02 6 0.04 13 0.07 27 0.12 
11 Workshop/managers 15 0.12 30 0.19 75 0.41 59 0.27 
12 Supervisor with direct control 96 0.79 168 1.06 235 1.29 237 1.07 
  Office positions  
  87.5 
(45.89)  
  84.4 
(50.05)  
 80.7 
(54.73)  
 73.3 
(55.56) 
13 Assistant director   6 0.04 26 0.14 51 0.23 
14 Subdirector 83 0.69 168 1.06 428 2.34 692 3.12 
15 Autonomous work 692 5.72 1252 7.91 1953 10.69 2598 11.71 
16 Qualified routine/work 3934 32.51 5830 36.81 7482 40.94 7661 34.52 
17 Routine work 5885 48.63 6124 38.67 4877 26.68 5275 23.77 
  Retail positions  
  3.3 
(28.36)  
  2.1 
(25.9)  
  1.4 
(46.46)  
  3.6 
(55.54) 
18 Shop manager/executive 26 0.21 30 0.19 37 0.20 32 0.14 
19 Salesclerk/shop assistant 376 3.11 302 1.91 231 1.26 769 3.47 
  Warehouse positions  
 1.1 
(5.4)  
 1.1 
(7.3)  
 1.4 
(9.57)  
  0.8 
(9.60) 
20 Manager/executive 4 0.03 15 0.09 30 1.26 25 0.11 
21 Clerk 129 1.07 158 1.00 166 0.16 162 0.73 
  Total 12101 100.00 15838 100.00 18277 100.00 22191 100.00 
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The distribution of women shows that most women work in office positions as 
the table display almost  87% in 1980 and 73% in 1990. Women are also mostly 
distributed at the three lowest ranks within the office position ladder.  
 The distribution of women in technical positions have increased from 7 % in 
1980 to almost 21 % in 1997. For supervisory, retail and warehouse positions the 
distribution of women  do not display any significant changes for the selected 
years. 
The share of women, or the female/male ratio display that office positions 
and retail positions are the most sex-integrated career ladders, were women 
actually make up over 50% of all workers for 1990 and 1997 . The share of women 
is miniscule in supervisory positions and also warehouse positions where they 
make up only 1.5% and 1% respectively for 1997. 
Earlier research done on the same data set available have shown that 
using the finer differentiation of 210 groups does not show very different results 
than if we use the aggregated one (Petersen et al 1997). As for establishment, I 
include controls for education, potential work experience and marital status.  I 
use dummy variables for each occupation group. At this level, I can see if the 
effect of children also plays a role when mothers and non-mothers work in the 
same occupation- groups. 
 
Occupation-establishment unit 
Finally, we can control for the occupation-establishment unit that individuals 
work in. I can precisely estimate the effect of children on hourly wages, once 
employers’ work in the same occupation for the same employer. I here use 
dummy variables for each occupation-establishment. As with the other levels I 
here include control variables. I can then see if the effect of children also plays a 
role at the occupation-establishment level, when mothers and non-mothers work 
in the same occupation-establishments. 
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This level also needs some further addressing. Some researchers have argued 
that controlling for occupation-establishment gives no meaning because the 
occupation-establishment per definition does not allow for any variation in pay. 
They argue that occupation-establishment is synonymous with wage level, and 
so the analysis makes no sense because per definition it cannot be any wage 
differences at such a level (see e.g. Barth 2003). This issue has mainly been 
emphasized in Scandinavian countries due to the form of wage setting which 
exits in this country. I cannot go into details about this in my thesis, but 
mentioned that Nielsen et al (2004) addressed this concern in a former analysis. 
By comparing wages in the same occupation-establishment they found that even 
within occupation-establishments there is a large degree of variation in pay. In 
fact, they found that within occupation-establishment the highest paid person 
could earn on average 22-34% more than the lowest paid person. As such 
occupational titles in the same establishments are not synonymous with wage 
levels, and there is enough variation in pay to estimate wage differences at this 
level as well. 
For all four different levels, the analyses’ will be obtained for each year. 
However, for the sake of clarity, I have computed the average impact of the 
coefficients for four different sub-groups. I will now present the methods that I 
will use for my analyses. 
  
5.2 Methods  
5.2.1 Analyzing panel data 
The data I will use is a panel data set, also referred to as cross-sectional time 
series data. Their central feature is that one records at regular intervals the status 
each individual in the panel occupies, and the individuals are observed at least 
two points or more in time (Petersen 2004: 331). In contrast, cross sectional data 
only offers one observation pr. individual. 
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The multiple observations give the data a grouped or a multilevel structure. The 
numerous observations at each point in time of the individual are the lower level, 
and the group is the individual, the higher level (Petersen 2004: 332). The more 
time points the individual are recorded, the more information is provided. If 
each individual are observed each possible time points the data set are called 
balanced. My data are unbalanced, thus individuals are not necessarily recorded 
for all years. 
In addition to the multiple observations of persons over time, the data also 
has another level, which arises from the occupation level  and the establishment 
level. Also these levels are observed several points in time, as much as each year 
from 1980-1997. This means that we have a matching of the individuals and the 
establishments and occupations these individuals work in for multiple years. 
This gives a unique complexity to the data. We can for example compare mothers 
and non-mothers wages working in the same occupations and same 
establishments at a given time point. But also since the data spans over 18 years 
we can follow the trajectories of mothers and non-mothers wages and see how 
they change over time.  
Another central feature is the within-individual information which arises 
with panel data. I can for example estimate wage changes as women moves from 
having no children to having 1, 2 and 3 or more children. Then we will see the 
within-individual differences. 
 
5.2.2 Statistical models 
Ordinary Least Square regression 
 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models are used to analyze differences 
in wages between individuals. In all the articles reviewed in Chapter 3, the 
estimates for the family gap are obtained with OLS. The results reported here 
would thus be more comparable when I use OLS than they would be with a 
different methodology. 
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In my analyses I will use different specifications of the model, which will take 
into account the different levels of the data (Petersen 2005). 
I will start with a cross sectional analysis for each year between mothers and 
non-mothers with the natural log for wage as a dependent variable. Independent 
variables will be a dummy for marital status, education, experience and its 
quadratic term, and dummy variables for number of children under 20 years of 
age. I regress the logarithm of wages lnWoeit where i =(1…,N) denotes individuals 
and t= (1980-1997) denotes time on explanatory variables xioet where єioet  denotes 
the error term. However, I will use four different specifications of this equation:        
 
                      
                   ln Woeit= αP,txioet +єioet                 (1)             
                   ln Woeit= αE,txioet + eη +єioet          (2)         
                   ln Woeit= αO,txioet + oη +єioet         (3) 
                   ln Woeit= αOE,txioet + oeη +єioet      (4) 
 
 
eη , oη and oeη  are vectors of parameters capturing fixed effects of establishment, 
occupation and occupation-establishment unit and єioet is the error terms. 
Important here is that for each constant term there is also a different subscript. 
This is reflecting that we have different coefficients for each level. P is for the 
population level, E is the establishment level, O is for occupation level and OE is 
for occupation-establishment level. 
Equation (1) does not take into account where the individuals work or 
what kind of occupation they are in. I will refer to this as the population level. 
The results from this analysis can be seen as a match up to the motherhood 
penalty reported from the articles surveyed in chapter 3, but with some minor 
adjustments: All of the estimates will be obtained separate for each of the 
eighteen years, but in the result section I will report the average of the yearly 
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coefficients for each sub-periods (1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1997). By 
comparing results from one sub-period to another I can see if the penalty has 
changed over time.  I will only present the coefficients for 1, 2 and 3 or more 
children under 20 years of age, net of all other covariates. I will not show 
coefficients for the control variables since I am exclusively concerned about the 
effect having children on hourly wages. Also, for the rest of the analyses, this will 
be the common practice. Thence, what I mainly will report is the average impact 
of children under age 20 have on women’s wages, net of all other covariates. 
The estimates from equation (2) take into account the workplace of the 
employees, the establishment level. Models from the third equation (3) controls 
for the occupation- group level and thus compare individuals in the same type of 
occupation groups. The fourth equation (4) also controls for the occupation-
establishment unit an individual works in. We can therefore very accurately see 
if the motherhood penalty is present when mothers and non-mothers work in the 
same occupation for the same employer. 
With my final analyses we can compare the coefficients at the different 
levels and see how they are changing once I control for establishment, 
occupation- group level and occupation-establishment unit. Each estimate 
describes one important aspect of the data, and will answer different questions.  
Up to this point I have described methods for looking at the family gap 
both over time and at different levels in the marked. But also of importance is to 
see if there are any intra-individual changes  in the penalties for women with 
children. My second research question asked which mothers bear the penalties. I 
can decompose the data into different educational groups and also see how the 
child penalties interact with marital statuses, and also see if sex-composition at 
job have an effect on the motherhood penalties. 
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Which mothers bear the child penalties? 
As mentioned earlier, it could be that the penalties for having children on wages 
vary according to different skill-level i.e. here measured as education level. 
To see if the effect of children varies between different education-groups, I will 
use a model that resemblance equation (1) but here I will estimate the effects 
separately for each educational group. I will use the broad classification of 
education. We can then se the effect of 1,2 and 3 or  more children under 20 years 
old for those who have completed middle school, high school,  college degree, 
masters and higher and professional education respectively. In this analysis I will 
report numbers for each year.  
 
Sex-composition a job  
Similarly, I want to examine if sex-composition at job can explain some of the 
motherhood penalties. In table 5.5 I showed the female/male ratios in 
parentheses for five different career ladders. I will estimate the effects of having 
children on mothers wages separately for five different career ladders. There are 
thus five career ladders the analyses will be done for: women in technical 
positions, supervisory positions, office positions, retail positions and last 
warehouse positions. I will do the analyses for each years here as well. 
 
Marital status  
As discussed in chapter 4, one might hypothesize that marital statuses in 
interaction with children will have different impact on women’s wages, though 
the direction of this is hard to predict.  
I will estimate the effects of children on women’s wages separately by 
marital status. However, this will be done in two steps. First I will use the OLS 
model to estimate differences between women with 0,1,2 and 3 or more children 
separately for never married, married and divorced women (the last category 
includes separated and widowed as well). Then I will estimate within-individual 
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differences of having 0,1,2 and 3 or more children. I will explain how to do the 
intra-individual analyses below. 
 
5.2.3 Fixed effects at the intra level 
In addition to variations of the total estimator and fixed effects (i.e. dummy 
variables) to take into account the different levels, I will also use the fixed effect 
estimator to make use of the intra-individual  information in the data in 
answering some of my research questions. I will now have fixed effects for 
persons. However, I will only perform intra individual analyses at the 
population level. I define a dummy variable Di = 1 for individual i and 0 
otherwise. This dummy are thus fixed across years for this individual. For this 
analyses the following specification will be used 
 
ln woeit   = α IP xioet + δ i Di + єioet 
 
 
Where δ i   are fixed effects and now the subscript IP to the α  coefficient denote 
that this is a fixed effect at the intra-population level. 
Since the panel data contains repeated observations of each individual it is 
possible to control for unobserved explanatory variables, also referred to as 
unobserved heterogeneity. For example if women with (more) children are less 
career oriented than women without children we can use a so called fixed-effects 
for persons which allows us to take into account such unobserved characteristics.  
Here I will look what happen to the respondents wages as they move from 
having 0 to having 1,2 and 3 or more children under age 20. When considering 
the child wage penalty, many scholars have argued the importance of controlling 
for unobserved heterogeneity (see e.g. Data Gupta and Smith 2002). The 
argument here is that the negative effect of children on women’s wages reflects 
some unobserved characteristic that correlates with lower earning potential. 
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Mothers and non-mothers could vary systematically when it comes to for 
example motivation for work, career ambition and so on and then the observed 
negative effect of children are a reflection of such individual characteristics 
rather then that of children. 
 To control for such unobserved effects one can compare women with 
themselves and see if mothers also have lower earning potential prior to having 
children. Crucial for such analyses will be to compare estimates from both fixed 
effects and OLS to see if the coefficient have changed from one estimator to 
another. 
However, this estimator need some further addressing. For the 
independent variables, we have two kinds of information, those who vary over 
time, such as wages or marital status, and those who are constant such as socio- 
economic background or sex. This distinction between time-variant and time-
invariant variables is important for what can actually be estimated (Petersen 
2004). One drawback with the fixed effect estimator is that one can only estimate 
effects of variables that change over time. To estimate coefficients for each year as 
done in the earlier analyses, will not work properly here because the variation 
between each year are to small to be considered time variant and therefore to be 
caught up by the estimator. Hence it will be necessary to divide the years into 
two groupings. I will therefore operate with two sub periods here: 1980-1989 and 
1990-1997. Also I need to drop the education variable since it is not changing a lot 
over time. 
The person- specific fixed effects will be obtained at the population level 
and I can compare the OLS and the fixed effects estimates. The fixed effects will 
account for the omitted variables in the OLS and it can help us see if the number 
of children under age 20 is biased by unobserved heterogeneity and also show 
the direction of this bias (Waldfogel 1997; Taniguchi 1999: 1014). 
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If mothers systematically have lower earning potentials than women without 
children, the fixed effect estimate of the child variable should be smaller than its 
counterpart in the OLS ( Tanaguchi 1999: 1014). 
 
5.2.3 Summary  
To sum up, by estimating the effect of children for each year, we can follow the 
trajectories of the motherhood penalties, and see if they have declined over time. 
Also by comparing the changes in the coefficients as one move from the 
population level to establishment level to the occupation-group level and so 
forth, one can see where the wage penalties for having children arises.  
This will, at least tentatively, give some implication for where policy will have 
the greatest impact for reducing the family gap in pay.  
And additionally, to see if the estimate varies systematically between 
women who are different with respect to their education, with respect to sex-
composition at job, and with respect to different marital status’, can be 
suggestive for where to target policies. This topic will be discussed further in the 
thesis. 
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6 Results  
In this section I will present the results from my analyses. The main goal is to see 
how children under the age 20 affect women’s wages. As indicated previously, it 
is important to reveal the mechanisms behind possible wage discrepancies 
between mothers and non-mothers. Any insight we gain on this topic is vital in  
illuminating other forms of gender inequality and inequity, especially the gender 
wage gap in pay.  
Before I present the results from my analyses some thoughts around what 
the coefficients represent can be of interest.  
In statistical models, one usually wants to include several control 
variables. This is to be sure that one has isolated a causal effect i.e. the effects 
children have on mother’s wages, instead of being a spurious correlation. It is 
thus tempting to think that more detailed models, or models that include and 
account for several variables, also are more informative, and give more proof to 
the fact that an actual causal effect exists. 
Petersen (2004) however argues that instead of looking at one estimator as 
better than another, one should rather think of the estimators as describing 
different aspects of the data, and they can be used in  complementary ways to 
address different questions.  
Consider the forthcoming analyses. I start by analyzing the wages of 
women with and without children with control for education and experience. I 
then extend the analyses to take into account the establishment these women 
work in. Further I account for the occupation and occupation-establishments.  
It is thus tempting to say that the penalties I find at the occupation-establishment 
levels are “superior” to the penalties I find at the population level, because here I 
have taken more information into account.  
However, a more fruitful way to think of it could be that for example the 
estimates from the establishment level reports what’s on average the difference 
between mothers and non-mothers wages once mothers and non-mothers work 
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in the same establishments. The estimates from the population level show on 
average the difference in wage between mothers and non-mothers with the same 
education level, and the same level of potential experience. Both estimators 
describe the data correctly. 
Therefore, I will use each type of estimator in order to capture the specific 
dimensions of the data to which they are suited. The different estimators will 
play a role in answering the research questions posed in chapter 4. 
In the first set of analyses I will see how the family gap in hourly wages is 
at four different levels, the population, establishment, occupation-group level 
and the occupation-establishment level. In these analyses it will be important to 
compare the changes in coefficients as one goes from one level to another. 
Her I will also address the concern of unobserved heterogeneity. I will therefore 
estimate effects of children on women’s wages at the intra-individual level. 
In the second set of analyses I will see how the family gap in pay is for 
women with different education levels. Here I will only take into account  
individual level characteristics such as experience and also control for marital 
status. We can then see if the motherhood penalty varies for mothers with higher 
or lower levels of education. Here I will do the analyses for each year for five 
different education groups.  
I will also estimate the effects of children under age 20 on women’s wages 
separately for five different career ladders. This is done in order to see if the 
penalties to motherhood varies with the sex- composition at the workplace.  
Last, I make use of the within-individual information in the data set but 
now separately by marital status. Now I will make comparisons and examine the 
average impact children have on wages, as women moves from having 0 to 1 to 2 
to 3 or more children for never married, married and divorced. 
For this analysis the estimates will be obtained for 2 sub-set of years, 1980-1989 
and for 1990-1997. 
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6.1 The family gap at different levels 
The population level 
The analyses are first done at the population level. In this analysis only 
individual level characteristics such as education and experience are taken into 
account. This analysis closely mirror the ones used in most of the articles 
surveyed in chapter 3 where only individual level characteristics are taken into 
account (e.g. Waldfogel 1997, 1998). To make use of the matched employer-
employee feature of the data, the analyses are further done at the establishment 
level with fixed effect for establishment, followed up for the occupation level 
with fixed effect for occupations, and lastly, at the occupation-establishment level 
with fixed effect for occupation-establishment. 
Through this analysis we can see if the effects we find at the population 
level are also observable at the other levels of analysis. Are the observed 
differences mostly due to individual-level differences in education and 
experience or are they a result of different sorting on establishments, occupations 
or occupation-establishments units? We will also learn how the family gap has 
developed in Norway over time and we will be in a position to answer the initial 
research questions posed in chapter 4. 
The results in table 6.1 show the effect of number of children under age 20 
at the population level, i.e. with only control for education, experience and 
experience squared. The reference category is a single woman, with completed 
middle school, 20 years old and with no children. This is the reference category 
used for all the subsequent analyses. The coefficients show the average across 
years for four sub-periods. All coefficients are statistically significant at 5% level 
or higher. The dummy variables for children are for having 1 child under age 20, 
2 children under age 20 and 3 or more children under age 20. 
The estimates are obtained for each year, but for the sake of clarity I 
present the average of the estimates for four sub-periods. 
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Table 6.1: The effect of children on (log) hourly earnings at the population level for four sub-periods,  
controlling for education, experience and experience squared 
  1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1997 
1 child -.035 -.027 -.025 -.022 
2 children -.078 -.066 -.037 -.030 
3 or more children -.111 -.105 -.053 -.036 
Note: All coefficients are significant at a 5% level or (usually) 0,1%level.The analyses is restricted to 
individuals from 20-50 years old, full-time workers 
 
 
The initial observation is that there is a negative effect of having children on (log) 
hourly wages and that the size of this effect depends on the number of children 
you have. This holds for all the four sub-periods. Over time, the negative effect of 
children on (log) hourly wages has steadily declined during the period under 
study. 
Between 1980-1989 the wage penalties suffered as a result of having 1, 2or 
3 or more children below age 20 ranged from 3, 7 to 11%. During the following 
period, from 1990-1997, the same coefficients shrank to about 2, 4 and 6% 
respectively. Thus a woman with 2 children in 1997 earned an average wage, 
which was 4% lower than a childless woman with identical education and work 
experience. 
 
The establishment level 
The next step is to see the impact of children on wages measured at the 
establishment level. Are the wage penalties for children any different when we 
control for the establishment in which the women work? I now include fixed 
effects i.e. dummy variable for establishments. I also control for education level 
marital status and potential experience. Table 6.2 shows the results for this 
analysis. 
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Table 6.2: The effect of children on (log) hourly earnings at the establishment level for four sub-periods,  
controlling for education, experience and experience squared 
  1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1997 
1 child -.027 -.019 -.018 -.016 
2 children -.061 -.051 -.031 -.022 
3 or more children -.093 -.090 -.047 -.032 
Note: All coefficients are significant at a 5% level or (usually) 0,1%level 
The analyses is restricted to individuals from 20-50 years old, full-time workers 
 
Initially, one should note the similarity between the pattern observed at the 
establishment level and the general pattern we discerned at the population level. 
There is a negative effect of having children on (log) hourly earnings for all the 
four sub-periods studied, and the negative effect increases with how many 
children below the age of 20 you have. Also, the wage penalties measured at this 
level have been declining over time.  
During the period 1980-1989 there is clear negative effects of having 
children. 1 child below the age of 20 reduces the wage with about 2-3%, 2 
children reduces the wage additionally with 5-6% and for 3 or more children the 
hourly wages drops with about 9%. 
 In 1990-1997, these penalties are diminished. During this period, a woman 
with 1 child earns on average 1, 5% less than a woman without children, all else 
equal. For 2 children the wage penalty is about 2-3% and for 3 or more children 
the penalty ranges from 3-5%. 
The penalties are for all sub-periods a bit smaller at the establishment level 
than at the population level. This could indicate that there are larger variations in 
wages between establishments than within establishments and that women with 
children tend to work in lower paying establishments than do women without 
children.  
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The occupation group level 
Next, I look at the family gap at the occupation level controlling for 21 
occupation groups. How the occupation group was assembled from the more 
detailed 210 occupations was explained in the previous chapter. I now use fixed 
effect for 21 occupation- groups. As for the occupation group level, I have 
included control for education and potential experience. 
 
Table 6.3: The effect of children on (log) hourly earnings at the occupation-group level for four sub-periods,  
controlling for  education, potential experience and experience squared 
  1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1997 
1 child -.023 -.016 -.010 -.004 
2 children -.050 -.036 -.014 -.005 
3 or more children -.063 -.054 -.016 -.005 
Note: All coefficients are significant at a 5% level or (usually) 0,1%level 
The analyses is restricted to individuals from 20-50 years old, full-time workers 
 
 
The results from table 6.3 shows that women with 1, 2 or 3 or more children 
below age 20 earn 1-2, 3-5 and 5-6% less than women without children during the 
time period 1980-1989. These effects are smaller than we saw at the establishment 
level. Nevertheless, for women with more than 1 child, the penalties are still 
substantial.  
For the next sub period 1990-1994, a significant change has occurred. Here 
all the coefficients have dropped down to around 1%. For the last sub-period 
1995-1997, the penalties are less than 1%. This shows that for all practical 
purposes, women with children whom work in similar occupations are not 
penalized for having children.  
 
The occupation-establishment level 
We then control for occupation-establishment unit. This is accomplished by 
using fixed effect for the occupation-establishment women works in. We here 
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compare women who work in the same occupation and also for the same 
employer.  
 
Table 6.4: The effect of children on (log) hourly earnings at the occupation-establishment level for  
four sub-periods, controlling for education, experience and experience squared 
  1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1997 
1 child -.020 -.019 -.005 -.003 
2 children -.041 -.026 -.008 -.001 
3 or more children -.051 -.045 -.016 -.005 
Note: All coefficients are significant at a 5% level or (usually) 0,1%level 
The analyses is restricted to individuals from 20-50 years old, full-time workers 
 
Also here, the coefficients are much smaller compared to the population and 
establishment level, and even less than at the occupation level. During the 1980s 
we still find substantial penalties ranging from 2, 4 to 5% for 1, 2 and 3 or more 
children below age 20. But once again, the effects have almost vanished in the 
1990s. 
We can summarize the findings of these regressions as follows: when we 
measure the effect of children below age 20 on women’s hourly wages at the 
population level, we find substantial differences between mothers and non-
mothers during the period under study.  The penalties gradually incline with 
number of children. But also, the panel data shows that the penalties have 
declined substantially over time. 
However, the wage differences also seem to vary substantially, depending 
on the level at which they are measured. It is at the population level that the 
wage penalty is strongest. Once we control for establishment, 21 occupation 
groups or occupation-establishment, the effects gets smaller and ultimately 
vanishes.  
 
6.1.1 Selection effects 
As I indicated in the theoretical discussion, it could be the case that women with 
children differ from women without children in unobservable ways that 
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influence their earning capacity. To control for such selection effects, we need to 
compare women with themselves both before and after having children. This can 
be accomplished with a fixed effect estimator. The fixed effect estimator controls 
for time-constant unobservable variables. Running a model with fixed effects, let 
us take into account any unobserved variables affecting earning capacity that are 
correlated with the number of children. The OLS model will not really capture 
this. Results from the fixed effect model are showed in table 6.5 
 
Table 6.5: alternative estimators of (log) hourly wages, 1980-1989  
and 1990-1997 
  1980-1989 1990-1997 
1 child -.019 -.014 
2 children -.039 -.030 
3 or more children -.059 -.046 
Note: All coefficients are significant at a 5% level or higher. The analyses  
is restricted to individuals from 20-50 years old, full-time workers 
 
 
Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity 
What we are looking for here is if and how the coefficients for children have 
changed, compared to the estimates obtained for the population level. To 
recapitulate: at the population level for the sub period 1985-1989, the negative 
impact of children on hourly wages was 3, 7 and 10%. Looking at the alternative 
estimator, controlling for fixed effects, we see that the coefficients have almost 
shrunk by 50 percent (and even more if I compare with the numbers from 1980-
1984). These results lend some support to the supposition of selection effects. It 
seems that it is the mothers with lower earning capacity who are more likely to 
have (more) children than mothers with higher earning capacity. 
But when we look at the coefficients for 1990-1997, which shows a penalty 
at 1, 3 and 4%, the coefficients are almost identical with the penalties estimated 
with the OLS model and the selection effects observed for the earlier period have 
now vanished. 
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6.2 Who are the mothers who are disadvantaged? 
In this section I will consider if the child penalties interacts with some 
characteristics of women such as education level or marital status. Here I will 
pay attention to the second research question raised in chapter 4: which mothers 
bear the penalties? I will first look at educational differences.  
            Earlier research has generated 2 competing hypotheses explaining the link 
between women’s wages and children. According to the “work-effort” 
hypothesis, which treats skill level as essentially equivalent to education level, 
highly educated women pay a smaller penalty for having children than women 
with less education because they can secure a more flexible work-schedule, 
which is more easily combined with childrearing. Advocates for the human 
capital theory, on the other hand, argue that it is the more highly skilled women 
who are penalized through lower pay. Highly skilled women should lose more 
of their human capital when they interrupt their career to have children and 
should therefore end up paying a greater wage penalty for motherhood than 
their less-skilled counterparts. Their person-specific human capital “depreciates” 
more rapidly when compared with the more fungible human capital of women 
with easily acquired skills. On this theory, we would expect the wage penalties to 
be higher for mothers with high levels of education (education is once again used 
as a proxy for skills). 
 
6.2.1 Five different education groups  
My analysis follows the conventions of earlier research in using education level 
as a proxy for skill-level. I ran the analysis separately for different education 
groups. The results are shown in table 6.6. 
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Table 6.6: the effect of 1,2, and 3 or more children on (log) hourly wages for five different education groups for the years 1980-1997. Restricted to individuals 20-50 years old. With control 
for experience and experience square. Row (1)middle school, row (2) high school, row (3) college degree, row (4) masters and higher and row (5) professional education 
 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
1                   
1  
 
-.032 
(.005) 
-.030 
(.004) 
-.036 
(.004) 
-.029 
(.004) 
-.030 
(.004) 
-.037 
(.004) 
-.026 
(.004) 
-.021 
(.004) 
-.020 
(.003) 
-.017 
(.003) 
-.023 
(.003) 
-.021 
(.003) 
-.019 
(.003) 
-.018 
(.003) 
-.013 
(.004) 
-.011 
(.004) 
-.021 
(.004) 
-.026 
(.004) 
2 
 
-.089 
(.005) 
-.080 
(.005) 
-.081 
(.004) 
-.074 
(.004) 
-.076 
(.005) 
-.073 
(.005) 
-.067 
(.005) 
-.063 
(.005) 
-.061 
(.004) 
-.046 
(.004) 
-.041 
(.004) 
-.045 
(.004) 
-.035 
(.004) 
-.032 
(.004) 
-.030 
(.004) 
-.027 
(.005) 
-.030 
(.005) 
-.031 
(.005) 
3  
 
-.119 
(.007) 
-.107 
(.007) 
-.108 
(.007) 
-.101 
(.007) 
-.091 
(.007) 
-.117 
(.008) 
-.108 
(.008) 
-.100 
(.008) 
-.101 
(.007) 
-.079 
(.007) 
-.077 
(.008) 
-.067 
(.008) 
-.062 
(.008) 
-.042 
(.008) 
-.039 
(.008) 
-.039 
(.008) 
-.048 
(.008) 
-.046 
(.009) 
2                   
1   
 
-.064 
(.008) 
-.036 
(.008) 
-.036 
(.008) 
-.037 
(.007) 
-.035 
(.007) 
-.030 
(.007) 
-.039 
(.006) 
-.021 
(.007) 
-.026 
(.005) 
-.025 
(.005) 
-.029 
(.005) 
-.036 
(.005) 
-.031 
(.005) 
-.025 
(.005) 
-.022 
(.005) 
-.021 
(.005) 
-.028 
(.005) 
-.023 
(.006) 
2  
 
-.097 
(.011) 
-.092 
(.010) 
-.088 
(.010) 
-.094 
(.009) 
-.083 
(.009) 
-.080 
(.008) 
-.092 
(.008) 
-.079 
(.008) 
-.079 
(.007) 
-.071 
(.006) 
-.055 
(.006 
-.054 
(.006) 
-.046 
(.006) 
-.039 
(.006) 
-.041 
(.006) 
-.037 
(.006) 
-.043 
(.006) 
-.037 
(.006) 
3  
 
-.163 
(.018) 
-.163 
(.017) 
-.140 
(.016) 
-.155 
(.016) 
-.111 
(.016) 
-.126 
(.016) 
-.130 
(.014) 
-.114 
(.015) 
-.124 
(.013) 
-.097 
(.013) 
-.089 
(.013) 
-.082 
(.012) 
-.084 
(.011) 
-.062 
(.012) 
-.049 
(.011) 
-.058 
(.010) 
-.041 
(.010) 
-.042 
(.010) 
3                   
1  
 
-.050 
(.030) 
-.043 
(.026) 
-.040 
(.024) 
-.040 
(.021) 
-.025 
(.019) 
 .003 
(.017)  
 .008 
(.015) 
 .035 
(.068) 
-.013 
(.013) 
-.021 
(.012) 
-.024 
(.011) 
-.039 
(.011) 
-.025 
(.010) 
-.024 
(.009) 
-.022 
(.009) 
-.016 
(.009) 
-.025 
(.009) 
-.024 
(.010) 
2  
 
-.042 
(.036) 
-.047 
(.032) 
-.054 
(.028) 
-.074 
(.026) 
-.070 
(.023) 
-.063 
(.019) 
-.072 
(.018) 
-.059 
(.019) 
-.055 
(.015) 
-.049 
(.014) 
-.040 
(.014) 
-.035 
(.013) 
-.035 
(.012) 
-.051 
(.011) 
-.042 
(.011) 
-.036 
(.011) 
-.045 
(.010) 
-.028 
(.011) 
3  
 
-.136 
(.055) 
-.173 
(.053) 
-.097 
(.043) 
-.092 
(.042) 
-.082 
(.037) 
-.138 
(.033) 
-.127 
(.031) 
-.073 
(.031) 
-.074 
(.027) 
-.103 
(.025) 
-.095 
(.025) 
-.075 
(.023) 
-.056 
(.023) 
-.041 
(.021) 
-.044 
(.020) 
-.035 
(.019) 
-.047 
(.019) 
-.043 
(.019) 
4                   
1  
 
.176 
(.105) 
 .080 
(.082) 
 .029 
(.073) 
 .033 
(.058) 
 .042 
(.051) 
-.013 
(.038) 
-.050 
(.032) 
-.063 
(.026) 
-.040 
(.022) 
-.033 
(.020) 
-.062 
(.022) 
-.047 
(.021) 
-.047 
(.021) 
-.017 
(.018) 
-.072 
(.021) 
-.022 
(.019) 
-.032 
(.016) 
-.021 
(.020) 
2 
 
.300 
(.164) 
 .199 
(.107) 
 .129 
(.087) 
 .129 
(.068) 
 .138 
(.056) 
 .089 
(.043) 
 .021 
(.035) 
-.030 
(.029) 
-.003 
(.025) 
-.012 
(.024) 
-.038 
(.025) 
 .014 
(.022) 
-.009 
(.022) 
-.003 
(.019) 
 .001 
(.022) 
 .023 
(.020) 
 .006 
(.018) 
 .009 
(.022) 
3  
 
.310 
(.171) 
 .427 
(.132) 
-.032 
(.014) 
 .112 
(.118) 
 .101 
(.093) 
 .039 
(.070) 
 .037 
(.057) 
-.045 
(.046) 
-.031 
(.040) 
-.028 
(.036) 
-.015 
(.040) 
-.009 
(.037) 
-.015 
(.032) 
 .017 
(.029) 
-.007 
(.032) 
-.000 
(.030) 
-.028 
(.024) 
-.010 
(.028) 
5                   
1  
 
-.021 
(.040) 
 .001 
(.034) 
 .008 
(.033) 
-.027 
(.029) 
-.005 
(.026) 
-.018 
(.022) 
 .004 
(.020) 
 .004 
(.021) 
-.010 
(.017) 
-.007 
(.015) 
 .008 
(.014) 
-.005 
(.013) 
-.009 
(.013) 
-.020 
(.012) 
-.013 
(.012) 
-.026 
(.011) 
-.023 
(.011) 
-.015 
(.012) 
2   
 
 .050 
(.055) 
 .071 
(.047) 
 .089 
(.039) 
 .165 
(.038) 
 .082 
(.034) 
 .043 
(.030) 
 .045 
(.027) 
-.012 
(.026) 
 .017 
(.021) 
 .002 
(.018) 
 .019 
(.017) 
 .014  
(.015) 
-.008 
(.014) 
-.001 
(.014) 
-.005 
(.013) 
-.020 
(.013) 
-.023 
(.012) 
-.022 
(.012) 
3  
  
 .066 
(.126) 
-.031 
(.084) 
-.015 
(.085) 
 .094 
(.068) 
 .013 
(.050) 
-.034 
(.049) 
-.013    
(.043) 
-.059 
(.046) 
-.087 
(.036) 
-.023 
(.034) 
 .036 
(.030) 
 .027 
(.025) 
 .021 
(.024) 
 .033 
(.023) 
 .017 
(.020) 
 .007 
(.019) 
-.001 
(.018) 
 .011 
(.018) 
Note: All coefficients are significant at a 5% level or higher, except coefficients with underscore, not significant. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
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It’s easy to get confused by all the different numbers here, but after a second look a 
clear pattern emerges from the analysis. 
To start off: row 1 and 2 show the results for women who have completed 
middle school and high school. Here the pattern is unambiguous; having children 
brings down wages for both groups during the period surveyed. These negative 
correlations increase with the number of children under 20 years old. Although the 
penalties are gradually declining over time, the magnitudes of the coefficients remain 
substantial throughout the eighties and beginning of the nineties. 
A similar pattern is observed with respect to those women who have 
completed college  (row 3), but especially for the earliest years, some of the 
coefficients are not significant. Even so, for the most part they show a negative effect 
of children on women’s wages. There are some coefficients that are positive for the 
years 1985, 1986 and 1987, but these are small in magnitude and they are not 
significant. 
Contradictory, the results for the 2 remaining groups, those with a master’s 
degree or a professional degree, are harder to interpret. The correlations between 
(log) hourly wages and children are for the most small and positive for these 2 
groupings. There does not seem to be an increasing relationship between the number 
of children and wage reductions. Also, almost none of the coefficients are significant.  
In brief, these analyses show that education level does have an impact on the 
penalties, and more schooling reduces the effects substantially. Eventually, one 
should note that the moderating effect of education does not seem to pay off until the 
woman has reached the masters or professional level. 
 
6.2.2 Sex-composition at the workplace  
Further I wanted to investigate if sex-composition at the workplace could explain 
some of the penalties. The background for these analysis was to see if the penalties 
varies for women in more heavily populated male jobs, compared to jobs with more 
women. 
Some researchers have argued that it is reason to suspect the penalties for 
having children to be lower in female dominated positions and higher in male 
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dominated positions. The argument for was described thoroughly in the theoretical 
chapter, but mention it briefly again. The theories predict that  penalties for having 
children would  be larger in heavily male dominated jobs, because career 
interruptions in conjunction with childbirth will here be rare, and therefore penalized 
more. Contrary, the theory predicts the penalties to be lower in more female 
dominated workplaces because either these jobs are more easily to re-enter after 
career interruptions, or these jobs are already lower paid to “compensate” for the 
expenses employers have with workers that take more career breaks. 
So how does this theory pertains to the data I have available? 
The computed female/male proportion from table 5.5 showed that  office positions 
and retail positions were the occupations with highest share of women, displaying 
55% and 56% respectively for the last years of observation. I should mention before  
I show the results from this analyses that the private sector is mostly a sector where 
men work so to see if the penalties are lower in heavily female occupation-groups is 
not possible. In fact the highest percent female domination I find for one of the career 
ladders shows  55,5% of women, thus it seems more sex-integrated than female 
dominated.  
Still, I considered it useful to see if working in environments with different 
sex-composition could explain some of the penalties for having children. For what 
it’s worth, the career ladders did display some significant variation in level of sex-
integration and also sex-segregation. 
To examine this, I did the analyses for five different  career ladders. I also did 
the analyses for each year to see if there was any changes over time. The results are 
showed in table 6.7.  
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Table 6.7: the effect of children on (log) hourly wages for five career ladders for the years 1980-1997. Restricted to individuals 20-50 years old. With control for education, experience and experience square. 
Row (1) technical positions, row (2) supervisory positions, row (3) office positions, row (4) retail positions, row (5) warehouse positions 
     1 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
1 child 
-.044 
(.016) 
-.043 
(.015) 
-.029 
(.014) 
-.036 
(.013) 
-.020 
(.013) 
-.026 
(.012) 
-.028 
(.011) 
-.026 
(.011) 
-.019 
(.009) 
-.021 
(.009) 
-.031 
(.009) 
-.029 
(.008) 
-.026 
(.008) 
-.018 
(.007) 
-.022 
(.008) 
-.024 
(.008) 
-.021 
(.008) 
-.022 
(.009) 
2 children 
-.081 
(.022) 
-.056 
(.019)     
-.034 
(.018) 
-.009 
(.017) 
-.032 
(.017) 
-.039 
(.016) 
-.039 
(.014) 
-.040 
(.014) 
-.008 
(.011) 
-.014 
(.011) 
-.012 
(.012) 
-.015 
(.010) 
-.012 
(.009) 
-.008 
(.009) 
-.005 
(.009) 
-.012 
(.009) 
-.009 
(.008) 
-.009 
(.009) 
3 or more 
-.085 
(.033) 
-.074 
(.027) 
-.043 
(.027) 
-.042 
(.025) 
-.021 
(.027) 
-.033 
(.025) 
-.009 
(.023) 
-.037 
(.023) 
-.042 
(.019) 
-.041 
(.019) 
-.019 
(.018) 
-.002 
(.017) 
-.025 
(.015) 
-.006 
(.015) 
 .000 
(.015) 
-.008 
(.013) 
-.009 
(.012) 
-.011 
(.013) 
    2                   
1 child 
-.050 
(.046) 
-.057 
(.035) 
-.051 
(.035) 
-.010 
(.032) 
-.036 
(.034) 
-.078 
(.031) 
-.005 
(.027) 
-.046 
(.027) 
-.052 
(.024) 
-.073 
(.023) 
-.037 
(.022) 
-.055 
(.020) 
 .003 
(.023) 
-.007 
(.021) 
-.032 
(.021) 
-.021 
(.021) 
 .011 
(.021) 
-.007 
(.024) 
2 children 
-.075 
(.044) 
-.117 
(.035) 
-.111 
(.036) 
-.080 
(.032) 
-.057 
(.034) 
-.088 
(.035) 
-.029 
(.028) 
-.048 
(.029) 
-.074 
(.028) 
-.085 
(.027) 
-.064 
(.026) 
-.060 
(.025) 
-.031 
(.029) 
-.026 
(.028) 
-.077 
(.028) 
-.034 
(.027) 
 .020 
(.026) 
-.015 
(.030) 
3 or more 
-.095 
(.050) 
-.101 
(.041) 
-.102 
(.042) 
-.093 
(.047) 
-.057 
(.051) 
-.054 
(.051) 
-.060 
(.045) 
-.098 
(.048) 
-.105 
(.048) 
-.094 
(.047) 
-.096 
(.043) 
-.046 
(.060) 
-.063 
(.062) 
-.100 
(.048) 
-.075 
(.038) 
-.077 
(.035) 
-.034 
(.033) 
-.027 
(.039) 
    3                   
1 child 
-.041 
(.004) 
-.035 
(.004) 
-.036 
(.004) 
-.033 
(.004) 
-.036 
(.004) 
-.036 
(.004) 
-.028 
(.004) 
-.017 
(.004) 
-.023 
(.003) 
-.022 
(.003) 
-.026 
(.004) 
-.030 
(.003) 
-.026 
(.003) 
-.026 
(.003) 
-.022 
(.003) 
-.016 
(.003) 
-.028 
(.003) 
-.025 
(.004) 
2 children 
-.087 
(.005) 
-.079 
(.005) 
-.080 
(.004) 
-.077 
(.004) 
-.074 
(.004) 
-.073 
(.005) 
-.078 
(.004) 
-.068 
(.005) 
-.069 
(.004) 
-.057 
(.004) 
-.047 
(.004) 
-.043 
(.004) 
-.039 
(.004) 
-.037 
(.004) 
-.037 
(.004) 
-.034 
(.004) 
-.042 
(.004) 
-.033 
(.005) 
3 or more 
-.129 
(.008) 
-.117 
(.007) 
-.108 
(.007) 
-.106 
(.008) 
-.100 
(.008) 
-.124 
(.008) 
-.128 
(.008) 
-.112 
(.008) 
-.114 
(.007) 
-.096 
(.007) 
-.084 
(.008) 
-.069 
(.008) 
-.064 
(.008) 
-.046 
(.008) 
-.042 
(.007) 
-.045 
(.007) 
-.047 
(.007) 
-.037 
(.007) 
   4                   
1 child 
-.008 
(.020) 
-.029 
(.020) 
-.030 
(.018) 
-.029 
(.020) 
 .017 
(.025) 
-.043 
(.026) 
 -.032 
(.031) 
-.009 
(.031) 
-.008 
(.026) 
-.006 
(.159) 
-.012 
(.027) 
-.019 
(.023) 
 .010 
(.022) 
 .021 
(.024) 
 .014 
(.022) 
 .005 
(.019) 
-.035 
(.019) 
-.066 
(.021) 
2 children 
-.049 
(.023) 
-.049 
(.022) 
-.035 
(.020) 
-.044 
(.025) 
-.016 
(.030) 
-.022 
(.032) 
-.061 
(.035) 
-.100 
(.035) 
-.037 
(.030) 
-.059 
(.030) 
-.028 
(.036) 
-.024 
(.028) 
-.021 
(.028) 
-.018 
(.031) 
-.019 
(.030) 
-.055 
(.028) 
-.022 
(.025) 
-.024 
(.026) 
3 or more 
-.076 
(.026) 
-.100 
(.028) 
-.097 
(.026) 
-.099 
(.030) 
-.030 
(.038) 
-.108 
(.039) 
-.003 
(.049) 
-.045 
(.058) 
-.081 
(.050) 
-.008 
(.053) 
-.019 
(.052) 
 .025 
(.054) 
 .018 
(.049) 
 .004 
(.046) 
 .054 
(.047) 
-.044 
(.040) 
 .001 
(.062) 
-.036 
(.044) 
   5                   
1 child 
 .001 
(.038) 
 .080 
(.034) 
-.004 
(.034) 
-.002 
(.032) 
-.008 
(.031) 
-.033 
(.035) 
-.044 
(.027) 
-.033 
(.029) 
-.035 
(.020) 
-.020 
(.020) 
 .000 
(.020) 
-.038 
(.019) 
 .002 
(.023) 
-.008 
(.021) 
 .002 
(.024) 
-.015 
(.024) 
 .002 
(.028) 
 .005 
(.029) 
2 children 
-.033 
(.039) 
 .059 
(.040) 
-.007 
(.039) 
-.040 
(.040) 
-.068 
(.038) 
-.057 
(.042) 
-.080 
(.036) 
-.082 
(.035) 
-.065 
(.025) 
-.009 
(.027) 
-.044 
(.025) 
-.076 
(.026) 
-.044 
(.024) 
-.033 
(.025) 
-.037 
(.028) 
-.031 
(.028) 
-.052 
(.035) 
-.005 
(.037) 
3 or more 
 .143 
(.074) 
 .038 
(.058) 
-.106 
(.049) 
-.091 
(.056) 
-.051 
(.061) 
-.102 
(.064) 
-.159 
(.056) 
-.102 
(.054) 
-.087 
(.034) 
-.021 
(.041) 
-.064 
(.042) 
-.061 
(.045) 
-.131 
(.058) 
-.067 
(.049) 
 .001 
(.051) 
 .011 
(.052) 
-.148 
(.062) 
-.057 
(.058) 
Note: All coefficients are significant at 5% level or higher, except coefficients with underscore; not significant. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
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As with the education analyses, the table seems a bit overwhelming. But one 
finding that has been consistent in all the former analyses is apparent here as 
well. The wage penalties for having children does for the most part increase with 
how many children you have, and they also decline over time. However, the 
penalties does not seem to vary systematically with the sex-composition at work.   
The most heavily female- dominated career ladders are office positions and retail 
positions. I find no support for the suggestion that the magnitude of the penalty 
varies systematically with the degree of female- domination in the workplace. In 
fact the penalties are rather different for the two career ladders, showing clear 
negative effects for women in office positions( row 3) and small, and for the most 
part insignificant effects for women in retail position. 
 For the most male dominated career ladders, supervisory positions (row 2) and 
warehouse positions (row 5) the effects are ambiguous, displaying both negative 
and positive coefficients.  
There are very few observations in some of the career ladders, and so I 
tried to combine observations for groupings of years, to see if  a more clear 
pattern then would emerge (results not shown). However, I still did not find any 
support for the suggestion that the motherhood penalties vary systematically 
with male/female domination at the workplace. 
 
6.2.3 Intra-individual changes 
I will also investigate the penalties to motherhood among women with different 
marital status. I will do this in two separate analyses.  
First I will use an Ordinary Least Square model. The estimates from this 
model will display the differences between women with 0,1,2 and 3 or more 
children separately by marital status. 
Next I will use a fixed effect estimator. The estimates from this model will 
display the within-individual differences as a women goes from having 0 to 
having 1, 2 and 3 or more children under age 20. By comparing estimates from 
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OLS and fixed effect estimator I can examine if the differences for  having 
children on wages are larger between women than within an individuals life.  
Since the fixed-effect can only estimate variables that change over time, I cannot 
run the analyses for each year. I also have to exclude the education variable, 
since it is not changing much over time. This was also explained thoroughly in 
the methods chapter. I will build on a study of Budig and England (2001) and use 
both OLS models and fixed effects model with fixed effects at the intra-
individual level. Instead of pooling the data across years as they did, however, I 
run the analyses for 2 different sub-periods, 1980-1989 and 1990-1997. This allows 
me to see if the effects have changed over time. Table 6.7 shows results from the 
2 models. 
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Table 6.8: Effect of  children on women’s hourly wages from Ordinary Least Square and fixed effects models,  
by marital status.  
                           1980-1989       
                    OLS                Fixed effects   
  Never married Married Divorced Never married Married Divorced* 
-.009  .003 -.030 -.030 -.013 .0003 
1 child (.004) (.003) (.005) (.002) (.001) (.003) 
 .009 -.042 -.073 -.063 -.028 .002 
2 children (.013) (.003) (.006) (.007) (.002) (.003) 
 .121 -.133 -.179 -.118 -.039 -.012 
3 or more children (.053) (.005) (.000) (.027) (.003) (.005) 
       
       
                          1990-1997       
                    OLS                Fixed effects   
  Never married Married Divorced Never married Married Divorced* 
-.029 -.016 -.024 -.022 -.007 -.008 
1 child (.002) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.011) (.003) 
-.019 -.021 -.039 -.042 -.021 -.016 
2 children (.003) (.001) (.003) (.002) (.001) (.003) 
-.029 -.025 -.044 -.059 -.035 -.023 
3 or more children (.008) (.002) (.005) (.005) (.002) (.004) 
Note: all coefficients are significant at 5% level or higher, except coefficients with underscore; not significant.  
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Restricted to individuals 20-50 years old, full-time workers 
*divorced includes here those who are separated, divorced and widowed 
 
 
Ordinary least square  
The OLS model shows that for the first time-period surveyed, 1980-1989, 
divorced women experience the highest penalties for having 1, 2 and 3 or more 
children compared to never married and married women. The penalties range 
from 3, 7 to 17% respectively. Married women also pay large wage penalties of 
children, but these effects are largely limited to second and higher order births, 
which displays penalties of about 4 and 13%. Within the next time period, 1990-
1997, the penalties have declined severely for both married and divorced women. 
However, the largest change in the coefficients is for never married women. 
During the years 1980-1989, never married seemed to mostly have a premium for 
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children, though this was limited to women with 3 or more children. Within the 
next time period, these effects give way to negative effects.  
 
Fixed effects 
In the fixed effect model I will now investigate the average impact on wage as a 
woman goes from having 0 children to having 1, 2 and 3 or more children. I will 
conduct this separately by marital status. To state the relevance of estimating two 
models one can ask: do women also prior to having children earn less when 
compared to women without children? 
To control for such selection effects, we need to compare women with 
themselves both before and after having children. To explain the effects of the 
fixed effect analysis I will make comparisons between the OLS and the fixed 
effect model. So what does this tell us? 
 
Never married women  
I will first comment on the results which pertains  to never married. 
In the OLS model when I compare never married women with 1,2 and 3 or more 
children, we actually don’t see any differences in wages except for women with 3 
or more children which  shows a 12 % raise in hourly wages. However, turning 
to the fixed effect estimator, the effect children have on wages as a women goes 
from having 0 to having  1, 2 and 3 or more are now pretty severe. This means 
that between  never married women with and without children, children do not 
play a significant role for lowering wages, but the fixed effects shows that never 
married women are penalized relatively to themselves, in that way that they 
would have done even better without children. Hence, the women who have 
gotten children appear to be somewhat different from those who did not, and 
appears to have higher earning potential than those who did not get children 
(given the small and positive coefficient in the OLS model), and as a result  the 
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difference between those who get children and those who do not are smaller 
than the within-individual differences in wages from 1,2, and 3 or more children. 
For the next time period the small and positive coefficients from the OLS model 
have given way to negative effects. In the OLS model, when I compare never 
married women with 0,1,2 and 3 or more children, there is now a relatively small 
negative difference in wages between those with 0, 1, 2  and 3 or more children of 
about 2-3 %. However, when I do intra-individual comparisons, there is larger 
negative impact on the individuals wage as women make transitions from 
having 0 to having 1, 2 and 3 or more children. The penalties are now of 2.2, 4.2 
and 5.9%. 
Again this means the following: women, who get children, do get 
penalized in wages for having children, that is relatively to themselves, in that 
they individually would have d1 better had they not had the children. But, the 
women who have gotten children appear to be somewhat different from those 
who did not, and appears to have higher earning power than those who did not 
(given the small coefficients in the OLS), and hence the difference between those 
who get children and those who do not are smaller than the within-individual 
differences in wages from 1,2, and 3 or more children. 
 
Married and divorced women 
For married women a different pattern emerges. Lets start with the years 1980-
1989. In the OLS model, when I compare married women with 0,1,2, and 3 or 
more children there are relatively large differences in wages between those who 
are not mothers and those with second or higher order births. A women with 2 
children earn on average  4 % less compared to non-mothers and a woman with 
3 or more children earn on average about 13% lower hourly ages. 
However , when I do intra-individual comparisons, there is smaller negative 
effects on the married women’s wages, that is relatively to themselves, as women 
make transitions from having 0 to having 1,2, and 3 or more children, namely of 
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1.3, 2.8 and 3.9%. So this reflect that among married women, those who have 
gotten children also earned lower wages prior to having children. As such the 
coefficients in the OLS model are bigger than it’s counterpart in the fixed effect 
estimator. The same pattern also hold for divorced women. 
When we turn to the next time-period, there are no substantial differences 
in the coefficient estimated from the OLS model compared with estimates from 
the fixed effect model for married women. For divorced women, the coefficients 
estimated with fixed effects show slightly smaller effects than compared to the 
OLS model. This can indicated that the selection effects still holds for divorced 
women, i.e. that divorced women also prior to having children had lower 
earning power than women who do not have children. 
 
6.3 Summary of results 
I can summarize the results from the different analyses’ as follows: 
With control for education and experience, mothers earn less than non-mothers 
for the whole time-period of study. These larger penalties in the earliest years are 
possible due to some selection affects, indicated by the results we saw from the 
alternative estimator. However, for the 1990s there are no longer any indications 
for such selection effects. The penalties have gradually declined over the years, 
and by the time period 1994-1997 the penalties for having children have been cut 
in half. At the occupation level and occupation-establishment level, the penalties 
were strong during the 1980s but have vanished in the 1990s. This findings 
indicate that the motherhood penalties observed are due to differential sorting of 
mothers and non-mothers on different occupation and occupation-
establishments that pay less, rather than due to employers paying mothers less 
than non-mothers. 
Further, the results showed that higher education level do correlate with 
lower motherhood penalties. However, the causal effect of education level for the 
motherhood penalties is not obvious and do need some further discussion. 
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Among women with different marital status, the results are complex. I will try to 
summarize them as follows. For never married women there seem to be a 
selection effect for the whole time-period surveyed, though it is declining over 
time, in that never married women with children, on average  have somewhat 
higher earning potential compared to never married women without children.  
 For married and divorced women the direction seems to be opposite.  At least 
for the years 1980-1989 married and divorced mothers have lower earning 
potential compared married and divorced non-mothers. However, these 
selection effects seems to have vanished out for married mothers in the next 
time-period. For divorced women, the selection effects still holds. The results will 
need some further discussion. 
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7. Discussion 
The previous analyses showed the impact of children under the age of 20 on 
women’s wages. I examined how the wage gaps induced by children between 
mothers and non-mothers varied significantly with what kind of occupations 
and establishments they worked in. I also examined the role that education level, 
sex-composition at job and marital status had for the motherhood penalties. The 
results also displayed that the relationships between motherhood and wages 
have changed over time. 
In this following section, I will discuss the findings more thoroughly and 
give some thoughts to how such wage differences between mothers and non-
mothers can come about. I will organize the discussion after the research 
questions posed in chapter 4. I will also discuss some methodological drawbacks 
in these analyses. 
 
7.1 Wage levels 
I will first discuss the results from the analyses pertaining to research question 
one. What is the family gap at the population level, the establishment level, the 
occupation-group level and the occupation-establishment level? Most important 
here is not to look at the coefficient at each level per se, but more how they 
change as one move from one level to another. The results was shown in chapter 
6 (table 6.1-6.4).  
In the earliest part of the period 1980-1989, there was clearly a penalty on 
wages for women with children under 20 years of age at all the four different 
levels. At the population level i.e. with control for only education and 
experience, mothers earn on average about 3,7 and 11% lower hourly wages with 
1, 2 and 3 or more children respectively than non-mothers, all else equal. At the 
establishment level we found smaller effects displaying 1.5% lower wages for 
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having 1 child, 2-3% lower wages for having 2 children and 5-6% for having 3 or 
more children.  
Especially penalties at the occupation-establishment level are worth 
mentioning. The results displayed that mothers on average earn between  2, 4, 
and 5% lower wages for having 1, 2 and 3 or more children than non-mothers. At 
this level I compare mothers and non-mothers in the same occupations working 
in the same firm, and I am therefore examining if employers pay mothers and 
non-mothers the same wages , once they perform same job for the same 
employer. The sizable penalties at the occupation-establishment level do indicate 
that differential treatment of mothers and non-mothers took place during the 
1980s. 
However, over time, these effects have declined. For the latest period 
1990-1997, there are still penalties at the population level and establishment level 
but these are pretty low, at least for having 1 or 2 children. However, once 
control for occupation-group is made, women with and without children earn 
about the same wages. There are thus two processes going on here 
simultaneously which affect the family gap in pay , something that the multilevel 
structure of the data illustrates. One is how the penalties for having children 
decline as one account for the different levels, another is the across-time 
dimension, showing how the penalties decline over time. Therefore, the best 
explanation for the observed pattern is that mothers tend to work in occupations 
and establishment where lower wages prevails. However, when mothers and 
non-mothers work in the same occupations and occupations-establishments, they 
receive the same pay. The reduction in the penalties for having children under 20 
years of age are simply due to different sorting of mothers compared to non-
mothers on different establishments and occupations. Given the decline in the 
penalties at the population level over time, this also indicates that the wage 
differences between occupations and establishments in 1997 are not nearly as 
severe as was for the beginning of the 1980s. 
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One should also note that it is not the occupation-establishment level that 
reduces the coefficients the most, but the occupation-group level. This result is 
striking given that I only control for 21 occupation group which is an aggregation 
of 155 occupations. 
What remains to be explained however,  is why women with children are 
sorted on such occupation and establishments that pay less? Why do mothers 
jobs pay less? I consider some possible explanations.  
 
7.1.1 Discrimination 
One plausible explanation for the observed penalties could be employer 
discrimination against mothers. Employers may take career interruptions as a 
signal of less career commitment or consider  women with (more) children less 
work- oriented compared to non-mothers. This can subsequently lead employers 
to give mothers less access to promotions within firms. Employers might also 
assign mothers to less rewarding jobs or jobs with less advancement systems 
metaphorically referred to as the “sticky floor”6. This concept was meant to 
describe the vast occupational segregation of women in low paid jobs (Behreide 
1992).These jobs typically offer less advancement opportunities than do higher 
positions or even no access to promotions within firms. Within the time-frame of 
this thesis, I have not been able to look at career advancement and promotions in 
these occupations mostly held by women with children. Further research should 
look at characteristics of these jobs and address if these are primarily dead-end 
jobs. However, the decline in the penalties once control for occupation or 
occupation-establishments are being made does indicate that jobs that primarily 
mothers hold are on average  lower paid compared to jobs non-mothers hold.  
                                                 
6 The concept of the sticky floor was initially offered to complement the more familiar notion of the ”glass ceiling 
hypothesis”. The latter was a statement that as women moves upwards on the work organizational ladder they meet 
sever obstacles and barriers, which eventually exclude women from top-position. For a thorough examination of the glass 
ceiling hypothesis e.g. Baxter and Wright 2000. 
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Placing workers in less rewarding jobs, or dead-end jobs also lies within the 
“opportunity structure” for employers to discriminate (Petersen and Saporta 
2004).  
Petersen and Saporta argue that in order to find out more about 
discrimination, we need to look at the possibilities for where employers can 
discriminate. For example, one could imagine that it is easier for employers to 
discriminate in hiring situations than in wage setting. Hiring situations are based 
more on subjective decisions from employers compared to wage setting within 
occupations. Especially the scale of pay in Norway is traditionally very fixed 
compared to other countries. Thus the hiring situation  could provide better 
opportunities for employers to give differential treatment. Promotions and 
placements within firms are also based on subjective decisions, and so here lies  
an opportunity for employers to give differential treatment between mothers and 
non-mothers. It could  for example be that mothers are systematically allocated 
to jobs with few advancement opportunities in point of hiring. As Petersen and 
Saporta explains it: “even with fair wage setting and promotion policies within 
firms, there will be differential outcomes if women are not hired into the firms 
and occupations with good wages and promotion opportunities” (Petersen and 
Saporta 2004: 896). The vast segregation of mothers in lower paid jobs could 
indicate exactly this, that mothers are not hired to the establishments and 
occupations with good wages, but channeled into low-paid ones.  
Further, this theory could also be appropriate for explaining why the 
penalties have declined at the occupation-establishment level. The negligible 
penalties once control for occupation and occupation-establishment are made 
does provide evidence that no within job-wage discrimination exists for the last 
years of study. This level captures the occupation level within the firm, so 
basically it will show if mothers are being paid less than non-mothers, once 
mothers and non-mothers work in the same occupation for the same employer. 
Such differential treatment is forbidden by law under the acts of equal pay for 
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same jobs. While these acts were implemented in the late 1970s one could expect 
to find a time lag in enforcement of these laws, and so the opportunity to 
discriminate mothers whom hold the same jobs as non-mothers was more 
feasible during the 1980s.  
 
7.1.2. The concept of choice 
A pay gap between mothers and non-mothers can come about without any 
employer discrimination against mothers (Petersen 2005). The larger gaps 
between mothers and non-mothers could be a reflection of differential 
employment choices from mothers adapting to a family situation. Mothers might 
choose to put fewer hours into work, or be promoted less than non-mothers 
because they want to spend more time with their children or have more energy 
for housework. Mothers may seek positions with lower wages or less career 
advancement simply because these jobs are more compatible with raising 
children. As such, the “sticky floors” discussed in the previous section, could be 
the bridging workplace for mothers who are juggling both jobs and childrearing 
at the same time. However, if mothers are assigned to do most the unpaid work 
at home and they have less effort or energy to give at work, the concept of 
“choice” is ambiguous. As Avellar and Smock puts it: “ Choices are firmly 
entrenched in the context of viability; if a woman cannot get ahead in a job, or 
share the child care equally with a partner, her choices are limited” (Avellar and 
Smock 2003:605). As to whether mothers are in lower paid occupation because of 
employer discrimination or by adaptive preferences caused by the division of 
labor within the family, remains an unresolved question. 
 
7.2 Characteristics among women 
When it comes to the results pertaining to answer the second research question, 
who are the mothers who are disadvantaged, the explanations are even less 
conclusive. I will comment on the results from the education analyses first. 
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7.2.1 Education level  
The results was shown in chapter 6 (table 6.6). For the three lowest levels, the 
results are straight forward. Mothers with middle school, high school and college 
degree bear the highest penalties. These results contradict the hypothesis 
instigated by advocates of human capital explanations. To recapitulate, 
advocates of human capital theory expected the penalties to be high for highly 
educated groups, because interruptions due to childrearing are more critical for 
high skilled persons. The idea behind such an explanation is that the atrophy rate 
i.e. the loss of earning potential that can be attributed to periods of work 
intermittence, is higher in positions which requires high education. When 
women have a career interruption in conjunction with childbearing one should 
then expect them to be more penalized than their lower educated counterparts. 
So what explains the rather different pattern observed here? 
One  explanation is that the motherhood penalty could also vary by level 
of education in different ways than simply replicate skill-level. Tanaguchi (1999) 
argues that education provides opportunities for career building that are crucial 
for women’s wage attainment. By studying a young cohort he finds that early 
child bearers have the highest motherhood penalties because ‘their career 
interruptions occur during a central period of career building. It could be that 
mothers with lower levels of education had children at a “critical stage” of their 
career building.  
Another explanation relevant for the family gap is the phenomenon of 
homogeneity among married spouses. Kitterød (2003) found for Norwegian data 
that couple with higher education levels  had more positive attitudes towards 
equally sharing of chores and childrearing  compared to couples with lower 
education level. If this also holds for my data, the more equally division of labor 
in such homes could probably mitigate the penalties to motherhood for higher 
educated groups.  
 89
However, if higher educated women are married to men with equally or higher 
education than themselves, it is also possible that husbands, or spouses in such 
families provide more money in the family. Such economic resources could allow 
families to pay for more private services for housework, childcare and so forth. 
This could enhance the opportunities for careers for those women. 
Rønsen and Lappegård (2005) have pointed out that the link between 
education and motherhood are multifaceted. It could be as Tanaguchi (1999) 
argues, that education in itself helps suppress the motherhood wage penalty. But 
a different explanation could be that women with higher level of education are 
positioning some unobserved characteristics (e.g. career motivation, ambitions) 
that also affect their wages. It is not easy to determine which way the causal 
arrow is aimed, and to establish this, one needs to use different statistical models 
than used in this thesis (e.g. history event analysis). The results from analyses 
done for different education levels should therefore be interpreted with caution. 
 
7.2.2 Sex-composition at job 
I also considered if the sex-composition at the workplace could explain some of 
the penalties. The result was shown in chapter 6 (table 6.7). I found no support 
for that theory. This needs some further addressing. 
I expected the wage penalties for having children to be smaller in more 
female dominated workplace’s than in more male dominated. This expectation 
had mainly two reasons. First, the theory of compensating differences emphasize 
that some jobs can be paid less if the employers offer some nonpecuniary 
amenities that workers will trade off for wages. If this theory carries some weight 
the penalties to motherhood should also be lower in such occupations because 
the wages have already been traded off. In the same vain, one would also expect 
the motherhood penalties to be higher in occupations with mostly male workers, 
since men are less likely to have career breaks in conjunction with childbirths. 
Accordingly, one would expect interruptions to be penalized more in heavily 
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male jobs. My findings shows that the penalties seems to go systematically 
neither up or down with female/ male domination at the workplace.  
First, the largest effects of having children are displayed among women in 
office positions. Women are also the majority of workers in these positions. This 
contradict the theory of compensating differences. However the female/ male 
ratio reveals  that the most heavily female dominated only reach up to about 
50%. It could be that the grouping of occupations is probably too sex-integrated, 
contrary to sex-segregated, but not female dominated so the mothers do get 
penalized in these occupations.  
However, results from career ladders mostly occupied by men does not 
show any higher penalties than was for the more sex-integrated ones. The vague 
and ambiguous results from this analysis are hard to say something accurate 
about, an so I leave it to further research to  look more thorough into this 
questions. 
 
7.2.3 Marital status 
Next I considered the penalties for having children among women with different 
marital status. When it comes to the results from this section the analysis’ did 
show some variation among women with different marital status. 
First I would like to mention that since I lack information of people that co-
habitates,  I will not give much interpretation to the never married group. During 
the 1990s the patterns for marriage changed dramatically, and cohabitation has 
now become a more common type of domestic arrangement. In fact statistics 
show that in the 1990s the parents of about half of all children born in Norway 
were unmarried (Leira 2002: 69). But in the data available, I cannot distinguish 
between those co-habiting from those being single. This certainly makes it 
difficult to give much substantial emphasis on my findings. 
However, for divorced and married women the result can be stated as 
follows. The OLS model showed that divorced and married mothers experienced 
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the highest penalties for having children  under 20 years of age in the time period 
1980-1989. Especially did the estimates show high penalties for second and 
higher order births. However the estimates from the fixed effects model revealed 
that the large penalties could be attributed to selection effects. Basically this 
means that married and divorced mothers had lower earning capacity than 
married an divorced women without children also prior to when they had 
children and so the effects one see from having 1,2 and 3 or more children on 
mothers wages are rather spurious than causal. 
However the strong selection effects that was prominent in the 1980s is 
almost vanished  for married mothers and are significantly reduced for divorced 
women over time. So the historical changes that has taken place over time is once 
again crucial for our understanding. As was discussed earlier, it also seem 
plausible that such selection effects should fade out as more and more women 
and mothers in general become part of the workforce. 
  After controlling for selection effects, married mothers have higher 
penalties compared to divorced women. So how can this be explained? 
The first scenario could indicate that being married and having children 
are especially difficult in this sector. Such an interpretation is also consistent with 
the increase of married women and women with two children I showed in table 
5.2 and 5.3 when part –time workers were included in a systematic manner in the 
data.However, given the similarity between the penalties for divorced mothers 
and married mothers this could also indicate that married mothers have another 
source of financial support, and so they have more time to allocate on their 
children without worrying to much about loosing wages.  
 Divorced mothers are also harder to say something about, given that the 
penalties for having children can be attributed to selection effects. It is also 
peculiar that the penalties for divorced mothers are not higher than for married 
mothers. After all, a divorce can be costly for both parents involved, and even 
with child support and shared custody, the balancing act between family and 
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work must be harder to juggle alone, than shared as is the case for married 
mothers. But this also shows that in terms of economic depletion, a divorce need 
not be so crucial for women today, at least in terms of wage reduction due to 
motherhood. 
 
7.2.4 Major changes over time 
What has happened over time to the motherhood penalty? Has the extension in 
family policies had any of the intended effects, namely to make the family-work 
conflict more tenable? 
The most straightforward finding from this study is the remarkable 
change in the penalties over time. For the 1980s, children decrease women’s 
hourly wages significantly. This holds for both the OLS model and the 
alternative estimator, controlling for selection effects. The penalties diminished 
somewhat when I controlled for selection effects at least for the first period. It 
could be, as stated earlier that women with lower earning capacity also have 
(more) children, but the opposite direction could also be true, that mothers have 
lower earning capacity because of more children. Nonetheless, such effects are 
not apparent during the 1990s.  
From the 1990s the disparities in wages observed between mothers and non-
mothers during the earliest years have now changed dramatically, the penalties 
are cut in half for having 1, 2 or 3 or more children. What brought about such a 
change? 
One possible explanation could be the increase of women with (small) 
children into the workplace. In Norway, this trend started in the 1970s and 
accelerated in the 1980. As such, the work behaviors of mothers and-non mothers 
converge more, and women with children stayed more continually in the labor 
force. Earlier, women with children left the workforce when they had children, 
now they remain employed.  The maternity leave schemas available also made a 
strong incentive for women to be employed even before they have children. A 
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stronger connection to the labor marked also raises the likelihood for women to 
return to the labor marked after giving birth as well (see e.g Rønsen and 
Sunstrøm 1998). It also seems plausible that the selection effects observed for the 
earliest years should diminish, as it becomes more and more institutionalized to 
combine family and careers.  
However, women’s employment and childcare services are closely 
interdependent. The increase of women with children in the workplace relies 
heavily on access to childcare services for children. Access to for example 
kindergartens allows women to maintain in the workforce over childbirth. The 
subsidized rates for kindergartens services in Norway should also enable women 
with children to choose such childcare services instead of being home. Over time 
the coverage rate of children on kindergartens have increased substantially. At 
the end of the period under study, 1997, almost 40% of children aged 1-2 years 
old had access to kindergartens, and the corresponding numbers for children 
aged 3-5 years old were 70% (Statistics Norway). 
The considerable decline in the penalties over time carries weight to the 
explanation that the family policies have had some of its intended effects namely 
to make the balancing act more tenable. 
 
7.2.5 Drawbacks and limitations 
There are a few limitations to my research. The first analyses showed that 
occupational segregation had a significant impact in explaining the motherhood 
penalties. However, whether mothers seek these occupations by choice or 
whether employers channel mothers in to such jobs, cannot be explained by the 
current investigation. In fact to settle such a discussion is difficult as long as we 
don’t have the necessary tools for examining discrimination. However, a more 
indirect approach could be taken. It could be interesting to examine what kind of 
occupations women work in before and after having children. Do they shift 
occupation? This will give increased information as to whether mothers are in 
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these occupations before having children, or if the job- placement happens 
primarily after having children.  
Hansen (1995) has showed in an earlier study of the private sector that 
women tend to seek to the more family-friendly public sector upon motherhood. 
Such “family-friendliness” could also exist within establishments or within firms 
in the private sector.  One could also look at promotion rates for mothers versus 
non-mothers. Are the occupations most mothers work in connected to any job-
ladder within the firm, and do they offer the same advancement opportunities 
that jobs with mostly non-mothers and maybe men hold? 
Another drawback concerns the education analyses. In these analyses I 
have not controlled for unobserved heterogeneity, so  to answer why the 
penalties are smaller for higher educated groups of women with children is 
difficult. Nevertheless, the analyses are suggestive. Further research should look 
more thoroughly into this subject. Is it something about  the jobs these women 
hold that makes it easier to combine family and career? Or are there some 
unobserved characteristics among women with higher education level that can 
explain lower penalties? Or is it more difficult for employers to discriminate 
women with children in positions that require high education? The questions are 
many, and so are the possible answers. 
A third concern is the fact that I cannot separate between single mothers 
and cohabiting mothers in the dataset. This certainly modifies the explanatory 
power of this analysis. Since the poverty rates generally are higher for single 
mothers, more knowledge about the family gap for these mothers is especially 
urgent. Further research with access to more detailed marital status information 
than used in this thesis should address the consequences motherhood has for 
single mothers more thoroughly. 
In the next chapter I will sum up the major findings from this study and 
discuss the findings in relation to the relevant theory and earlier findings. I will 
also discuss what political consequences my findings might have. 
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8 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
The previous analyses have addressed the wage gap in pay between mothers and 
non-mothers in Norway. One of the goals for this thesis was to isolate the major 
determinants for this gap.  
The first analyses focused on where in the market the penalties arise. I 
examined if the penalties mainly is due to differential treatment from employers 
or if they are due to differential sorting on occupations and establishments. 
The second analyses tried to address if the penalties vary with some 
characteristics among women. I examined whether different educational 
attainment or different marital status played a role in creating penalties. I also 
examined if sex-composition at the workplace could explain some of the penalty. 
All of these analyses also addressed the impact of children on women’s 
wages over time and examined if the relationship has changed. 
The reason for these analyses was the growing international literature that 
has addressed the impact children have on women’s wages. Most studies show a 
negative effect. Out of this literature grew a specific interest in the potential role 
family policy can have in mitigating such effects (see e.g. Harkness and 
Waldfogel 2003). The longitudinal data set that I had available covers a period in 
Norway where several policies were implemented concerning the balancing act 
of family and careers for families. I have focused entirely on women’s outcomes 
in this thesis. 
This chapter summarizes the findings and discusses the results in 
relevance to theory and earlier research. I will also say something about policy 
implications for my findings. 
 
8.1 Discussion    
After controlling only for human capital variables, there is a penalty for having 
children on mothers’ wages. The penalties also increase with number of children. 
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The penalties I find at the population level i.e. with only control for human 
capital variables resemble the penalties found in earlier studies, both in the 
United Kingdom and in the United States (e.g. Joshi, Paci and Waldfogel 1999; 
Budig and England 2001). However, the wage penalties I find are generally lower 
compared to findings from the United Kingdom and the United States. For 
example Budig and England (2001) report 7 % penalties for each additional child 
from the United States, while the penalties I find is about 2-4% for two or more 
children for the last period of study. What is also an interesting finding is 
whether using age or constructing more accurate measure of “potential 
experience” does little to account for the gap in pay between mothers and non-
mother(results not shown). To focus solely on lost experience for explaining the 
family gap does not seem to be very fruitful for our understanding of the family 
gap7. This is also true for findings from the United Kingdom and the United 
States. 
The penalties I find when only controlling for human capital variables, are 
higher than those found from other Scandinavian countries using similar 
methods. Results from Denmark showed no penalties (Datta Gupta and Smith 
2002), and this was also true for Sweden (Albrecht, Sundstrøm, Edin and 
Vroman 1999). As for the latter, Sweden has even more extensive family polices 
than Norway, which can affect the results.  
In Denmark selection effects accounted for much of the wage gap between 
mothers and non-mothers. Once this was controlled for, they find no 
motherhood penalties. I have used similar methods as Datta Gupta and Smith 
(2002).I did find a tendency to selection effects in the earliest part of the time-
period (see table 6.5), but these effects are no longer apparent in the latest years 
of study. 
                                                 
7 Here I  mean as a direct cause. Of course lost experience could lead to lower advancement opportunities, or lower job-
placement 
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8.1.1 Accounting for establishment, occupation-group and occupation-
establishments 
Contrary to previous research I was also able to depict where in the market the 
penalties arise. The matched employer-employee data available  shows that the 
penalties to motherhood in Norway are mostly due to different sorting of 
mothers and non-mothers on occupations and establishments. This sorting seems 
to be the main determinant for which penalties arises. Whether such sorting of 
mothers and non-mothers arises from employer discrimination, educational 
segregation or adaptations to family situations is harder to say something about.  
However, once mothers and non-mothers work in the same occupation or 
same occupation-establishment unit the penalties are vanished. As such, there is 
no evidence of differential treatment from employers for the last years of 
observation when mothers and non-mothers work in same occupation within the 
same firm.  
Yet, there must be something about these jobs held by mothers that also 
can explain their lower wages. My findings indicate that the motherhood 
penalties largely flow through occupational segregation. This was discussed 
under the section occupational segregation in chapter 2. Whether such 
segregation happens due to some supply side mechanisms or demand side 
mechanisms is hard to say something accurate about. The supply side focused on 
what the employees, or in this case, women prefer. One obvious explanation 
would be to think that the jobs mothers hold have  some mother-friendly 
amenities which makes it easier for mothers to combine work and family.  
On the demand side, I also presented several ideas as to why employers 
might discriminate against mothers. Employers might channel mothers into 
different kinds of jobs than non-mothers because mothers are expected to take 
more sick leaves in conjunction with childrearing, or employers  anticipate 
mothers to be less productive at work, and they respond to this by giving 
mothers less promotions or paying mothers less. In fact there are evidence of 
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employers discrimination for the earliest years of the study, when I examined the 
family gap in pay at the occupation-establishment level. However, these 
differential treatment effects vanished over time. 
  On the other hand, one can argue that the supply and demand side 
mechanisms are also heavily intertwined. The factors influencing mothers 
preferences for some type of jobs may also influence employers preference for 
workers.  
Previous research has mainly looked at differences in penalties between 
public and private sector, and not on occupational segregation per se to 
investigate the family gap. This research has however pertained mostly to 
Scandinavian countries since within these countries there is a difference in family 
friendliness between the two sectors.  
Nielsen, Simonsen and Verner (2004), do  find from Denmark that the 
motherhood penalties are much smaller for public sector than the private sector. 
However, these result does not show up before after they have used a complex 
model controlling for selection effects to the sectors. It would be interesting to do 
something similar for Norway. 
However, their result give some support to the theory of compensating 
differences, as they find no penalties for mothers working in the public sector, 
but large negative effects for mothers working in the private sector. What is 
important is that public sector pay less than the private sector. 
While my findings only pertains to the private sector, the results shows 
that the establishments and occupations mothers work in, pay less than 
establishments women without children work at. While this is strong indication 
that the occupations also are more easily combined with motherhood, I will be 
careful in saying something ascertain about this. More evidence and proof of 
such “mother friendliness” is needed. 
England have argued that at least for the United States, what generates 
occupational segregation is not necessarily mother friendliness in these 
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occupations, since the occupations heavily occupied by mothers rarely offers the 
amenities such mother friendliness would indicate (England 2005:281). However, 
this might be different for the Scandinavian welfare regimes, where for the most 
part the state have been active employer of women with children and also in the 
forefront when it comes to family policies at the workplace. The private sector is 
also enforced to follow such a practice. 
 
8.1.2 Educational attainment 
I also examined if the penalties varies for mothers with different educational 
attainment. Human capital theory depicts that higher educated women should 
experience the highest penalties because the human capital level in high skilled 
positions are more vulnerable to “depreciates”. I found no support for this 
hypothesis, in fact my results shows that the opposite is the case as the penalties 
are lower for higher educated women. This suggests that we need to consider 
other explanations. 
Previous research of the family gap has not addressed this issue to a large 
extent. One exception is from The United States (see Anderson, Krause and 
Binder 2002, 2003), but the findings from these studies are ambiguous. The 
division of different education levels will also largely vary between countries, 
something that makes comparisons difficult. Budig and England (2001) also 
investigate if the motherhood penalty was dissimilar for different education 
groups, but did not find any significant variation, nor did they report the results 
from this analysis. 
  
8.1.3 Sex-composition at job 
I did not find any support for the supposition that sex-composition at the 
workplace should diminish or increase the motherhood penalties. As discussed 
previously, this could reflect the fact that this is largely a sector made up of men, 
and female are not overrepresented or dominating in any kinds of occupations 
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groups. But how does my findings correspond with previous research? Budig 
and England (2001) find that penalties are slightly lower for women in heavily 
male dominated jobs. Interestingly they also found that high-level male jobs 
penalized women less for having children. This findings are at stake with the 
compensating differential theory, and also human capital theory which 
emphasize that male jobs, and especially high level male jobs have high atrophy 
rates. 
   
8.1.4 Marital status   
The result from the analyses which examined the role marital status play for the 
motherhood penalties suffered some drawbacks in that I could not investigate 
the role for single mothers. 
           However, after controlling for selection effects I find that married mothers 
are most penalized compared to divorced mothers. Budig and England (2001) 
report similar results pertaining to the United States, however the magnitude of 
the penalties they find are more severe.  
         The differences in the penalties among mothers with different marital status 
indicates that the motherhood penalty is not exclusively a consequence of 
employer discrimination, unless one believes that employers discriminate more 
against married mothers than divorced mothers.( Budig and England 2001: 218) 
As such, it is probably a combination of lower effort from mothers at a given 
point in time, and also employer discrimination. The motifs and ways employers 
can discriminate was discussed in the previous chapter. 
 
8.1.5 Family policies, a remedy for the family gap? 
The role that children have played for women’s wage outcomes has changed at 
lot during the period of study. In the earlier part of the period, the motherhood 
penalty was quite severe at the population level, the establishment level, the 
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occupation level and the occupation-establishment level. But over time, these 
effects decline, especially at the occupation and occupation-establishment level. 
This is an important finding and contradicts most research done on this before. 
Joshi, Paci and Waldfogel (1999) find for the United Kingdom that the gap 
between mothers and non-mothers has even widened over the years. Avellar and 
Smock (2003) do not find a reduction in the motherhood penalties over time for 
the United States. Evidence of a decrease in the motherhood penalty does (to my 
knowledge) not exist in Scandinavia prior to this study for the family gap 
literature. 
  The result from this investigation points to the notion of Norway as an 
intermediate case, as discussed in chapter 4. While Norway has more family 
policies than the United States and the United Kingdom, it has less than 
Denmark and Sweden. The results from my analyses’ also mirrors this. For 
example are the penalties for having children on mothers wages that I find, much 
smaller than the penalties found in the United States, but larger than found in 
other Scandinavian countries. 
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8.2 Policy Implications 
What are the implications of my findings?  
If we look to research from Sweden, they found no gap in pay between mothers 
and non-mothers, and so it would be tempting to suggest even more generous 
maternity leaves. However, in terms of narrowing the gap between mothers and 
non-mothers I think there is little gain in further extensions. Women still lose 
income upon giving birth, and also valuable human capital that can help increase 
their wages. In such a perspective policies should encourage women to shorter 
career interruptions to help decrease the overall cost of children for mothers. 
However, this is probably in conflict with another concern of family policy, 
which is to protect children’s interests. So one can ask what changes are needed 
to equalize the difference between mothers and non-mothers which is not 
conflicting the interest of children? It is beyond the scope of this thesis to reflect 
on different remedies vigorously, but I will mention some of them. 
The crucial mechanism amplifying the family gap seems to be the amount 
of sorting on occupations. One remedy could be to lessen the amount of such 
sorting (Petersen 2005: 211). Whether the sorting happens in the hiring situation, 
or is a result of educational choices or adaptations to family will clearly require 
different resolutions. The targets for such resolutions will also vary. In hiring 
situations, increased vigilance or regulation of employers’ actions could be 
beneficial (Petersen 2005: 211). Employers would here be the targets. When it 
comes to educational segregation, mostly the school systems and their 
recruitment systems would have to change. Typically young women will be the 
targets of such a change. Whether the sorting is mostly due to adaptations to 
family situation, the targets are not so self-evident. As discussed earlier, these 
adaptations among mothers could be a result of the unequal division of labor in 
the households, or it could reflect mothers’ own preferences. If it’s mostly due to 
the first mechanism, then fathers should be the main target. More pressure on 
equal sharing of childrearing or equal share of the parental leave could be 
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possible remedies. In fact we see the contours of such policy right now, with 
increased focus on the “daddy quota” (i.e. four weeks of the parental leave which 
is specifically designated for the father). But of course, to equalize the domestic 
arrangement between mothers and fathers, more transforming changes than the 
rather symbolic gesture four weeks represent is needed (Leira 2002). However, 
there will be upper bounds for how policy making can interfere with families’ 
lives. At last the practice of everyday life has to be determined by families 
themselves. 
Another remedy could be to change the way internal labor markets are 
structured, especially within those lower paid jobs mostly mothers work in. This 
can occur through changing the promotion systems, providing more career 
opportunities in lower paid jobs, giving ways to different and less rigid forms of 
advancement and so forth. Raising the wages in these occupations is another 
suggestion. 
The responsibility for such changes would not just be that of employers, 
but also for policy makers as they should try to induce such changes. But why 
would employers and policy makers be interested in such transforming changes? 
From an equity perspective it is unfair that mothers should have to pay the cost 
of motherhood in forms of lower wages. As argued by Budig and England 
(2001), we all benefit from mothers childrearing of the future generation. 
Childrearing will help children to become well-behaved, stable and productive 
adults which of both employers and society profits. The children growing up are 
also the future employees and tax-payers ( Avellar and Smock 2003). 
It is also implemented in the government’s policy to keep up the high rate of 
fertility that we now have (to secure population replacement). And so the 
government should be an active agent in facilitating a combination of 
motherhood and being part of the workforce. While the family policies in 
Norway have had many goals, on of motifs for women’s employment have been 
pronationalist motifs (see e.g. Rønsen 2004). The higher fertility rates in Norway, 
 104
also indicates that these politics has been efficient. However, this motifs may 
have overlooked the fact that most of the cost of children affect women’s pay. 
For employers one can argue that mothers are an important part of their 
workforce and make important contributions to the paid economy. Employers 
should recognize their workers potential by giving mothers the same 
opportunities as other workers.  
 
8.3 Concluding Remarks 
I have in this thesis investigated how motherhood affect employed women’s 
hourly earnings. There are two key findings in my thesis. 
The first finding is that there is a difference in wages between women 
with and without children. The explanations for this is mainly due to differential 
sorting of mothers and non-mothers on different occupations and different 
establishments. Whether such sorting is mostly due to employer discrimination 
or employee adaptations is difficult to determine. More evidence of how families 
and mothers structure the balancing act between work and home is needed to 
answer such a question. However, once mothers and non-mothers work in the 
same occupations and within the same establishments, there is no evidence of 
differential treatment from employers.  
The other key finding is that the combination of children and labor work 
for mothers in the private sector of the economy has become easier over the 18 
year of study, as the gap in pay between mothers and non-mothers steadily has 
declined over the years. This change is probably a result of the extension in 
family policies implemented under the years of study, which was aimed at 
mitigating the work-family conflict for women.  
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